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Abstract 
Inadequate communication of domain knowledge in natural language (such as English) has 
been implicated as a major source of requirements defects in high-confidence software. Such 
defects can lead to loss of lives and property. This thesis develops two techniques that offer 
partial solutions to the requirements defects problem. First, the thesis describes a technique 
for resolving requirements confusion, a problem that has been observed repeatedly during 
testing and operations of complex, high-confidence software, and a source of requirements 
defects. The technique defines requirements patterns for recurring sets of requirements 
confusion, and then uses these patterns to create formal specifications of the correct behavior. 
This approach allows the user to identify and explore any gaps between the expected and the 
correct behavior using the specification tool's simulation capabilities. The thesis illustrates 
and evaluates the technique on real-world sets of requirements confusion involving 
watermarks. The second major contribution of this thesis is to describe a technique for 
preventing some timing requirements defects caused by communication gaps during domain 
knowledge transfer between system experts and software engineers. The technique applies 
timing constraints on software inputs and relies on data-age, a variable that must be defined 
for each input to the software. The thesis defines the guidelines for specifying the behavior 
of data-age variables, as well as how to use them in setting the timing constraints of the 
corresponding inputs. The technique is applied to a Mars Polar Lander (MPL) software 
module through formal specification of the module. Analysis shows how this technique 
could have been used to prevent a requirement defect due to the gaps in domain knowledge 
communication, perhaps preventing the MPL accident. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Natural languages (such as English) are commonly used as the sole medium of 
communication during software requirements elicitation and documentation. Although rich 
in descriptive power, natural languages are also known to contribute to various forms of 
requirements defects. Recent research on complex high-confidence software has indicated a 
link between requirements defects and inadequate communication (also referred to as 
communication gaps) of domain knowledge during the software development and operations 
[18, 40, 9]. The term domain refers to the context or the purpose for which the software is 
designed. For example, software built for a spacecraft is considered to be in aerospace 
domain. Domain knowledge therefore refers to expertise in a specific area of interest such as 
aerospace engineering. 
Communication gaps are inevitable since natural languages lack the strict syntax and 
semantics of formal languages, and hence the natural language descriptions of complex 
software often tend to be ambiguous or incomplete. Furthermore, the lack of formalism in 
natural languages makes it difficult to check arbitrary natural language requirements 
documents for elusive flaws such as ambiguous or missing requirements statements. 
A requirement defect occurs when a software program works as intended by the developers, 
but does not satisfy the users or the environmental constraints [23]. Requirements defects 
come in various forms, some of which are addressed in this work. In Chapter 2 we address 
requirements confusion, a form of requirements defect common in complex high-confidence 
software systems. In Chapter 3 we address ambiguous and incomplete requirements. 
Requirements defects are undesirable in high-confidence software as they can lead to loss of 
lives, mission or critical infrastructure. High-confidence software systems are those systems 
where non-functional properties such as safety, security and reliability are a priority. 
Examples of high-confidence systems include aerospace, commercial aircraft, power plants 
and medical devices applications. 
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The types of requirements defects addressed in this work are often caused by gaps in domain 
knowledge communication. The communication gaps often lead to inadequate understanding 
of the system requirements [30, 3], and ultimately the defects discussed above. Our work 
acknowledges the reliance of requirements process on natural language, and hence proposes 
approaches that employ a combination of formal and informal techniques during this phase to 
offset the limitations of natural languages. 
Requirement confusion occurs when a developer, a tester or an operator makes erroneous 
requirements assumptions. In this work we treat requirements confusions as a form of 
requirements defects because: 
1. Erroneous requirements assumptions by testers or operators can lead to unexpected 
system behavior. This implies that the users are not satisfied with the system. 
2. Erroneous requirements assumptions by developers can lead to creation of software 
that does not satisfy user needs. 
In this work we use the term requirements confusion independent of application domain or 
level of detail to address problems related to system behavior during development, test or 
operations phases. 
The term requirements confusion was used by Lutz and Mikulski [30, 31] in describing the 
mechanisms for discovery and resolution of requirements during the test phase. The 
requirements confusion problem is different from ambiguous requirements problem. 
Ambiguous requirements are vague or unclear requirements and can be a source of 
requirements confusion. Analysis of requirements confusions can lead to documentation 
change in order to make them clearer as in [30], hence implying that the documentations 
were ambiguous. On the other hand, some requirements confusions are not due to 
ambiguous requirements, but to inadequate communication in describing the software 
behavior to the tester or user. 
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The requirements confusion problem is closely related to two other problems: mode 
confusion and automation surprise. Mode confusion occurs when an operator (e.g., a pilot) 
believes that the automation is in a mode different than the actual mode, or when the operator 
does not fully understand the behavior when the system is in certain modes, or how the 
modes interact [32]. Modes define mutually exclusive sets of system behavior [28]. The 
mode confusion problem is common in aircraft software [28, 32], although it can appear in 
any complex system that uses modes. 
The term automation surprise has often been used in research addressing pilot-autopilot 
interaction problems [41, 34, 37, 6]. An automation surprise occurs when an automated 
system behaves differently than its operator expects [37, 34]. 
The term automation surprise can be viewed as a generalization of mode confusion since 
both terms address a similar problem within the same application domain. The term 
automation surprise is often used to address the general problem of unexpected behavior 
while using the autopilot, while mode confusion is used to address the same problem at a 
more detailed level. Likewise, the term requirements confusion can be viewed as a 
generalization of both mode confusion and automation surprise, since we use it to address 
unexpected behavior at any level of detail and in any domain. 
Requirements confusion, mode confusion and automation surprise are often observed during 
test and operations phases [41, 30, 31]. Research on these problems has shown that the three 
problems are fundamentally caused by inadequate understanding of accurate system behavior 
[3, 30]. The differences between these problems and the terminologies used to name them 
reflect the level of system behavior being addressed and application domain being 
considered. 
Besides requirements confusion, this work addresses two more types of requirements defects: 
ambiguous requirements and missing requirements. A software requirements specification 
document is unambiguous if and only if every requirement statement in it has only one 
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interpretation [5]. Ambiguous requirements can lead to requirement misinterpretation. 
Hanks et al. point out that requirement misinterpretation during complex systems 
development is inevitable due to the fact that software engineers often lack accurate 
conceptions of the real world semantics relevant to the system, hence resorting to invalid 
assumptions [13]. A developer facing a complex or ambiguous system requirement is likely 
to interpret it in a way that will simplify the implementation [38]. The result of such actions 
can be defective software. 
The term missing requirements is often associated with the term incomplete requirements. 
An incomplete requirements document is manifested when domain specific information is 
not passed from the system experts to the software engineers during the process of 
requirements elicitation. Incomplete requirements can lead to defective software as in [ 18, 
23]. 
In Chapter 2, we address the problem of requirements confusion. Requirements confusion in 
high-confidence systems is partly caused by the complexity of software components. The 
current trend in the development of such systems has been to assign more and more control 
responsibilities to the software [25]. As software complexity increases, so do confusions 
regarding the behavior of the software. Recent research has shown that requirements 
confusion and related problems (e.g., mode confusion and automation surprise) are a 
significant cause of recent aerospace incidents and accidents [3, 26, 41]. The motivation for 
the work on this problem comes from our previous finding that requirements confusion often 
caused anomalies during the testing and operations of several spacecraft [30]. 
Certain types of software requirements seem to cause confusion more readily than others. 
For example, Leveson et al. have identified fifteen types of common mode confusions [28] 
that recur in aerospace systems. Similarly, we found that certain types of requirements 
confusion recurred during testing and operations of the critical systems we studied. We 
group the requirements confusion problems into sets of problems each of which can be 
solved using guidelines from the same pattern. It is these patterns of recurring requirements 
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confusion that we seek to specify and resolve with the technique presented here. The 
likelihood of recurrence of these requirements-based confusions drives our interest. 
Greenwell, Knight and Strunk have urged better investigation of incidents with high 
probability of recurrence [12]. We offer a practical approach for identifying and resolving 
potential requirements confusion problems in order to avoid these recurring confusions or 
misunderstandings. 
Requirements confusions are undesirable, regardless of when they occur during the software 
development process. Requirements confusion by developers can lead to defective software, 
which may or may not be detected by testers. Requirements confusion by testers and 
operators can lead to false-positive defect reports (if the software behavior is correct and the 
tester is merely confused) or to incorrect operations (if the software behavior is wrong but 
consistent with the operator's expectation). 
We describe atool-supported approach for resolving requirements confusion that can be used 
at any phase of the software lifecycle. Our approach suggests identifying recurring problems 
and formulating generic requirements patterns to clarify correct structure and behavior 
surrounding the confusion. Most of these confusions are due to the use of natural language 
as the sole mode of communication during the requirements definition and analysis phase. 
We thus use the formal requirements specification toolset SCRTooI [16] along with the 
identified patterns to create executable requirements specifications that depict correct system 
behavior. Developers, testers or operators can explore both the correct and the (possibly 
different) expected behavior in the executable specification and run simulations for 
verification. Requirements confusion are thus identified and resolved. The executable 
specification can also be used by developers or any other system users to confirm the 
behavior of critical components, thereby making it a training tool for understanding system 
behavior in this or similar future systems. The main contributions of Chapter 2 are thus 
summarized as follows: 
1. Introducing a technique for resolving requirements confusion through integration of 
requirements patterns and tool-supported executable specifications. 
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2. Identifying the use of watermark variable as a source of requirements confusion in the 
class of high-confidence software systems studied. Watermarks are data structures 
that capture the highest or lowest value that a monitor detects. 
3. Formulating the requirements pattern for resolving the requirements confusion 
involving watermark variables . 
In chapter 3 we address the problem of requirements defects due to gaps in domain 
knowledge communication between domain experts and software engineers. In particular, 
we focus on ambiguous and incomplete requirements. This problem is important in 
embedded systems where control tasks are assigned to the software. An example of an 
embedded system is a modern aircraft, where software is used as an interface between the 
pilot and the aircraft. Development of complex systems such as an aircraft involves domain 
experts (e.g., aerospace, electrical and mechanical engineers) and software engineers (e.g., 
developers and testers). The two groups do not share common knowledge and therefore 
precise communication between them is critical in producing safe and dependable products. 
We use the phrase "domain-knowledge related defects" to refer to those defects caused by 
poor domain knowledge communication. 
Domain-knowledge related requirements defects are common in embedded software. The 
report on the loss of the MPL [ 18] describes how domain experts failed to alert software 
developers of the existence of spurious signals from the sensors during the legs deployment 
stage of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL). The design didn't account for the spurious signals 
and the software ended up using them as valid touchdown signals hence shutting down the 
engines while the spacecraft was still airborne. The MPL crashed and the mission was lost. 
In another example of a possible case of domain-knowledge requirement defect, a computer 
in a B-lA aircraft closed weapons bay door hours after the operator issued the command [9]. 
The command had been issued during the test phase while a mechanical inhibit was on and 
therefore the door did not close. When the test phase was completed several hours later, the 
mechanical inhibit was removed and the door closed unexpectedly due to the previous 
command, which was no longer valid. Timers were applied to all software commands to fix 
this problem. Although [9] does not specifically describe the source of B-lA software 
incident, gaps in communication between system experts and software developers can be 
extrapolated as one of the possible sources of such defect. If developers did not know of the 
existence of, or clearly understand the functionality of mechanical inhibit, then they would 
not bother to put timers on software commands. Instead, they would assume that all software 
commands to the hardware are executed by the hardware without delay. 
The MPL accident and the B-lA incident exhibit a similarity that can be used to discover 
requirements errors (in this case missing requirements) or mitigate the effects of such errors. 
In both cases, timing constraints on data usage from software inputs were not adequately 
specified. The MPL accident was caused by data being used prematurely, whereas the B-lA 
incident was a case of data being used after it had expired. The B-lA case was solved by 
applying timers to all inputs [9]. The same approach does not work for the MPL accident 
because the occurrence of spurious signals did not rely on time. This fact motivated us to 
look into a different approach capable of capturing missing or misinterpreted domain 
knowledge information hence detecting the requirements errors. 
We describe a technique for specifying timing constraints on data usage from software 
inputs. The technique applies data-age, a variable that must be defined for each software 
variable that represents input from a hardware sensor. Data-age variable consists of two 
states: Enabled and Disabled. When data-age is in an Enabled state, the software can use the 
corresponding input. However, when data-age is in Disabled state, the software cannot use 
that input. The technique consists of a checklist of structural and behavioral properties as 
well as possible environmental constraints on the hardware sensor that must be formally 
specified for each data-age variable in the system in order to determine its state. 
We believe that our work on Chapter 3 is significant for the following reasons: 
1. Our approach introduces and applies data-age variable to determine when to use 
sensor inputs. Traditionally timers or clock tick events have been used to determine 
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the validity of sensor inputs [25, 22, 14] . Our approach is more general because it 
covers a case where a decision on when to use inputs to the software does not rely on 
clock ticks or passage of time, but rather on other quantities such as pressure, 
temperature or altitude. In those scenarios, the use of data-age is simpler and more 
direct. Furthermore, data-age approach can be used as an abstraction of timer 
approach by using the timer or clock to determine when data-age is Enabled or 
Disabled. 
2. The process of specifying when to use or not use inputs to the software (through data-
age variable) can assist in capturing missing requirements. This process will trigger 
specific questions to the domain experts on when to enable or disable data-age 
variable. Furthermore, the process can help in clarifying some critical system 
behaviors to the software engineers instead of making assumptions. Through 
executable specification, those behaviors can be observed and hence the specification 
can be used as a training tool for critical system behaviors involving inputs. 
We apply this technique to MPL software module and analyze how this technique could have 
been used to discover the missing requirement due to gaps in domain knowledge 
communication. We discuss how the technique might have prevented the communication 
gaps and eventual loss of the MPL mission. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 discusses requirements confusion and describes the technique to resolve them. It 
is divided into four sections. Section 1 discusses related work in the area of requirements 
confusion, requirements patterns, and executable specifications. Section 2 presents the 
technique for tool-supported resolution of requirements confusion. Section 3 presents an 
application of the technique to a common class of requirements confusion, namely 
watermarks. Watermarks are data structures that capture the highest or lowest value that a 
monitor detects. Section 4 evaluates this approach. 
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Chapter 3 discusses requirements defects due to gaps in domain knowledge communication 
and describes a technique to discover and prevent them. It is divided into five sections. 
Section 1 discusses related work in the areas of domain knowledge communication and 
requirements defects. Section 2 presents the technique for discovering and preventing 
requirements defects through analysis and specification of timing constraints on data usage 
for software inputs, as well as introducing the data-age variable. Section 3 applies the 
technique on all inputs to the Mars Polar Lander software module. Section 4 discusses a 
different approach used to prevent the error observed in the Mars Polar Lander software. 
Section 5 evaluates our technique. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the contributions, offers some concluding remarks and discusses 
future work. 
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Chapter 2: Requirements Confusions Resolution Technique 
2.1 Related Work 
2.1.1 Requirements Confusion 
Previous work found patterns of requirements confusion in testing and anomaly reports from 
eight spacecraft [30, 31]. Erroneous requirements assumptions made by testers often resulted 
in false-positive anomaly reports that raised an alarm when the software was not broken. 
Some of these anomaly reports documented misunderstandings of the requirements during 
testing that could recur in operations, sometimes with serious effects. 
For example, in one case the tester erroneously assumed that a data channel output the value 
of a counter when the channel actually provided the highest value yet recorded for that 
counter (i.e., a high watermark). Thus, even when the counter was reset to zero, the output 
value on the channel remained constant. This appeared to be an error to the tester and so was 
documented in an anomaly report. In fact, the software behaved as required, providing the 
fault-protection monitor with information regarding the worst case reached during an 
interval. The requirements confusion by the tester was reasonable and suggests that a similar 
erroneous assumption might be possible when later operating the deployed system. 
Analysis of the anomaly reports for testing and operations found other recurring patterns of 
requirements confusion. One example is requirements confusion regarding relative time 
measurements (deltas) and absolute time measurements (e.g., Universal Time Code), and 
their respective resets. Another example of recurring requirements misunderstanding 
involves component unavailability versus component unresponsiveness. This confusion is of 
concern because such requirements are often involved in fault-protection software. 
Requirements confusion also recurred with distinguishing software-commanded transients or 
delays from inherent, performance-related transients or delays. Additional examples are 
described in [31], and work continues in this area. 
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Frequently the anomaly reports for one system also noted that the same requirements 
confusion could occur on other, future spacecraft. This suggests that the requirements 
patterns and executable specifications developed here may also be useful in the development 
of new systems in the same domain. Our focus in this work, however, remains on the 
"continuous requirements management" [8] needed to prevent common patterns of 
requirements confusion from leaking into operations. We investigate how automated 
requirements-engineering tools can assist in targeting this subset of requirements that appear 
to be prone to on-going misunderstanding. 
Research in mode confusion and automation surprise has concentrated on identifying 
recurring problems and then searching the requirements specification for them either 
manually or with tool support. The emphasis has been on early-phase removal of potential 
hazards. For example, Leveson and Palmer identified indirect mode transition, where 
transition occurs without user input, as a potential cause of mode confusion [27]. Mode 
confusion can cause an operator to issue an inappropriate command or skip a necessary 
action. Bowman and Faconti modeled user-interfaces, transformed them into textual 
specifications and then analyzed them for hazardous paths that a user might take [2]. Butler, 
Miller, Potts and Carreno have used formal methods to try to eliminate potential mode 
confusions during the requirements analysis of flight control systems [3]. Rushby used the 
Murk state exploration tool [7] to model both the user's model of the system and the actual 
system, and then to compare them [37]. 
The work presented here differs in two key ways from previous research. First, while 
previous work has only applied techniques to avoid mode confusion at early phases of 
development, our approach can also be used to handle requirements confusion at later phases 
of development with the goal of preventing recurrence during operations. Second, rather 
than constructing the user's mental model, our approach has been to mine projects' software 
problem reports to identify recurring classes of requirements confusion. This effectively 
focuses available resources on historical mismatches between expected and actual software 
behavior. 
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2.1.2 Requirements Patterns 
Design patterns offer a standard solution to recurring design problems [10]. Konrad and 
Cheng introduced requirements patterns for embedded systems to similarly provide a 
standard structure, notation, and constraint specification for common requirements patterns 
[20, 21]. "Actuator-Sensor" is one of the patterns introduced in [21] with the purpose of 
providing guidelines when specifying various kinds of sensors and actuators for embedded 
systems. We use the notion of requirement patterns to informally capture the behavior and 
constraints of recurring requirements in a format that can be readily translated into formal 
specifications. Formulating the requirements pattern before the formal specification makes 
the formal model easier both to develop and to validate. The combination of informal 
requirements patterns and formal specifications of the patterns provides a way to simulate 
both the required and the (possibly distinct) expected behavior. This provides a way for 
different users such as testers and operators to interactively check system behavior through 
entering expected behavior into the executable specification. 
2.1.3 SCRTooI 
The automated toolset used for specification and execution of the requirements is the 
Software Cost Reduction Tool (SCRTooI), a requirements specification and analysis toolset 
developed by the U.S. Naval Research Lab. Any specification tool that supports state-based 
requirements modeling and simulation could be used, but SCRTooI has several advantages. 
SCRTooI was selected for its usability, executable specifications, and availability. It has 
been used to specify a variety of high-integrity software systems. The toolset includes an 
editor, consistency checker, simulator and verifier. 
SCRTooI is based on the Four Variable Model [35]. The Four Variable Model is a formal 
representation of system functions, timing and accuracy as a set of mathematical relations on 
four sets of variables: monitored variables, input data items, output data items and controlled 
variables. A monitored variable represents a quantity from the environment that influences 
system behavior while a controlled variable is an environmental quantity that the system 
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controls. Input data items and output data items are software representations of monitored 
and controlled variables respectively. A black box specification of a software system is 
represented using abstract relations on the four sets of variables. The implementation of 
those relations is discussed in the SCRTooI description below. The interested reader is 
directed to [35] for more detail on the Four Variable Model. In this work, we use the term 
input to represent either monitored variable or input data item, and the term output to 
represent either controlled variable or output data item where appropriate. 
In SCRTooI, software requirements specifications are entered and displayed using tabular 
notation. The information on SCRTooI is drawn from [16J. The interested reader is directed 
to this source for detailed information on this tool. 
SCRTooI consists of a specification editor with dictionaries and tables in which the user 
enters the specification. There are six dictionaries: the constant, type, mode-class, assertions, 
assumptions and variable dictionaries. The type dictionary is used to store user defined 
types, whereas the mode-class dictionary is used to store mode classes. Three types of 
variables are defined in SCR: monitored (input) variables, controlled (output) variables and 
terms. Controlled variables and terms are defined in terms of other system entities (including 
monitored variables) while monitored variables are independent. 
In addition, there are three types of tables used to specify the behavior of the system: 
• Condition tables -describe an output variable or a term as a function of a mode and a 
condition. 
• Event tables -describe an output variable or a term as a function of a mode and an 
event. 
• Mode transition tables - describe a mode as a function of another mode and an event. 
SCRTooI uses the notations @ T, @ F, and @ C to represent events. These notations are 
usually used with Boolean statements as arguments. For example, suppose that a Boolean 
variable called switch is defined in the system with two possible values, True or False. The 
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following examples show the valuation of the three notations when the variable switch is 
passed to them as a parameter: 
• @T(switch) -evaluates to True if the value of switch was False in the previous state 
and True in the current state (SCRTooI keeps both previous and current state 
information for each entity defined in the model). 
• @F(switch) -evaluates to True if the value of switch was True in the previous state 
and False in the current state. 
• @C(switch) -evaluates to True if the value of switch in the current state is different 
from that of the previous state. 
In SCRTooI, a specification of the requirements is entered in tabular notation and stored in an 
SCR specification file (ssl). Automated checks on data types, disjointedness, coverage and 
assertions can be done on this specification file. A Java executable specification can be 
automatically generated by SCRTooI from the ssl file. Simulation of the executable 
specification is performed using the SCR Simulator. The simulator runs the executable 
specification using an event file of input variables. The simulation results display the 
resulting mode changes and output values which demonstrate whether the specification meets 
the requirements. 
Assertions (predicates defined in SCRTooI's assertion dictionary) are checked during the 
simulation run. If an assertion violation occurs, the SCR simulator flags the violation by 
inserting a violation message in the state in which the violation occurs and providing the 
name of the violated assertion. 
2.2 ATool-Supported Technique for Resolving Requirements 
Confusion 
Our approach to resolving requirements confusion consists of four steps: (1) Identifying the 
common requirements confusion from software problem reports, (2) Formulating the 
requirements patterns to resolve the confusion, (3) Formally specifying the requirements 
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using the patterns as a guide; and (4) Using (distributing and simulating) the executable 
specification for requirements confusion resolution or for training purposes. Figure 1 is a 
graphical representation of this technique. In the diagram we divide the fourth step into two 
sub-steps to clarify the roles of the user. Detailed description of the technique follows the 
figure. 
1. Identify common 
requirements confusion 
2. Formulate requirements 
patterns to resolve the 
identified confusions 
3. Formally specify software 
requirements using pattern as 
a guide 




4b. Run simulations of 




User (developer, tester, 
operator, etc) 
Figure 1 -Requirements confusion resolution steps 
2.2.1 Step I -Identifying Comfnon Requirements Confusion 
This step involves an investigation into common requirements confusion in systems. Sources 
can include anomaly reports from development, testing or operations phases. Discussion of 
this step is beyond the scope of this work; see [31] for a detailed account of the process and 
results used here. 
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2.2.2 Step 2 -Formulating Requirements Patterns 
Step 2 formulates requirements patterns from recurring requirements confusion identified in 
step 1. This step involves ahigh-level description of the structural and behavioral 
requirements of software entities that are involved in the confusion. These high-level 
descriptions will then be refined to address a specific problem, implemented using a 
specification tool, and reused in both current and future systems. Table 1 provides a template 
for formulating requirements patterns. 
2.2.2.1 Requirements Pattern Template 
The requirements pattern template described below generalizes the elements of the UML-
based pattern template defined in [21] to the Four Variable Model approach used here. In 
this way the pattern's elements map more readily to the formal SCR specification. 
Table 1 -Requirements pattern template 
Element Description 
Pattern Name Name of the pattern. 
Classification Classification depends on the nature of the requirements confusion problem. 
It could either be behavioral or structural. 
Intent Brief description of the problems) that the pattern solves. 
Motivation Brief high-level description of recurring problems that led to development 
of the pattern. Examples could be anomaly, accident or incident reports. 
Applicability Description of when and where the pattern is applicable. 
Structure Textual and/or graphical descriptions of modules, variables or other system 
entities which are significant to the pattern. Structure includes dependency 
graphs and types of the entities under consideration. 
Behavior Description of the behavior of the system entities that are involved in the 
pattern. The description is done using text and/or state transition diagrams. 
Constraints Structural or behavioral limitations that should be imposed on the system. 
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A pattern is defined in a generic way so that it can cover a family of requirements confusion 
problems. The main difference between two problems within the same family is structure, 
behavior and constraints. Other elements of the pattern such as intent, motivation, and 
applicability are similar. Instantiation of the pattern during the formal specification below 
refers to applying the pattern to a member of the family of problems. 
2.2.3 Step 3 -Formally Specifying the Requirements Using Guidelines from 
the Pattern 
Once the requirements pattern is formulated, it serves as a guideline for development of the 
formal specification. Application of the pattern involves instantiation of the pattern to a 
particular problem under consideration. Two main issues arise in using patterns as guidelines 
for specification: (1) how to apply the pattern and (2) how to validate the resulting 
specification. We address each of these issues below in the context of SCR notation. 
Appl_yin~ the pattern 
The following are guidelines for selecting and applying the pattern: 
1. Select an appropriate pattern by referring to the information in the classification, 
intent, motivation and applicability sections of the pattern. 
2. Create a specification following guidelines from the structural and behavioral sections 
of the pattern. 
a. Structure - Represent system entities described in the pattern as SCR 
monitored variables, controlled variables, terms or constants. Ensure that the 
specification maintains the relationships between entities described in the 
pattern by inspecting the SCR specification's dependency graph. 
b. Behavior -Represent states described in the pattern as SCR modes or mode 
classes. Represent state transitions described in the pattern in SCRTooI's 
mode transition tables . 
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Validating the resulting specification 
Showing that the specification satisfies the requirements pattern entails: (a) assuring that the 
constraints described in the pattern are met by the specification and (b) assuring that the 
specification structure and behavior satisfy both system and pattern descriptions. 
1. Validating specification against constraints -this process cannot be completely 
formal, and therefore we apply both formal and informal techniques. For constraints 
that are translatable to formal assertions, we execute the specifications to check for 
violations. For constraints not formally specified, we inspect the specification for 
conformance. 
2. Validating specification against structure and behavior -this is achieved through 
inspection of the specification to confirm that each relevant element of the pattern is 
addressed by the specification. The RAISE method [36] suggests stepping through 
the list of informal requirements to confirm that each item on the list is addressed by 
some item in the specification. A similar approach was used with the requirements 
patterns by stepping through relevant structure, behavior and constraints sections. 
We also experimented with the representation of requirements confusion associated with a 
pattern as a set of "misuse" patterns. The purpose of applying a misuse pattern is to describe 
the requirements confusion that the requirements pattern is trying to prevent. Defining 
misuse patterns helped clarify the distinctions between correct and incorrect system 
behaviors. Misuse patterns are discussed further in the application of the technique section. 
2.2.4 Step 4 -Distributing and Simulating the Executable Specification 
In order to prevent future requirements confusion, the executable specification is distributed 
to users such as developers, testers and operators. This allows them to explore through 
simulation the correct software behavior and to identify any gaps between their expectations 
on the software behavior and its actual behavior prior to operational usage. The underlying 
goal is to prevent requirements related anomalies during operations. Users have two options 
in exploring the behavior of the system through the executable specification: 
19 
a. Run the executable specification and verify behavior by observing the simulation. 
b. Enter the expected behavior in the specification and simulate it in order to verify 
whether the expected behavior is valid. 
When a user chooses the first option, the simulation runs and displays the correct behavior of 
the system. Figure 2 shows the second option. As an example of the second option, suppose 
that a tester encounters unexpected behavior during the testing of the software. The tester 
will enter expected behavior into the formal SCR specification in the form of assertions and 
run a simulation of the specification using an event file. If an assertion violation occurs 
during the simulation, then the tester's assumptions are incorrect, implying that the software 
implementation is correct. If no violation occurs, then the tester's expectations are correct 
since they match specification behavior. Therefore, the software implementation is incorrect 
and needs review. The fundamental assumption here is that the software specification is 
correctly representing the requirements of the system. The flow diagram for the general case 
in which the user enters expected behavior in the specification is represented by Figure 2. 
User enters expected behavior 
to the executable specification 
T 
The simulation of the 
specification is run 







Figure 2 -Flow diagram for simulation that involves user-defined behavior 
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2.3 Application 
In this section we demonstrate and apply our technique to watermarks, a recurring source of 
requirements confusion. High (respectively, low) watermarks are data structures that record 
the highest (respectively, lowest) value that a monitored sensor experiences. Watermarks are 
widely used in fault detection and recovery software to monitor and track sensor and system 
performance. They are also used in mobile wireless networks to trigger handoff notification 
[39], and in Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) networks to determine when 
topology reconfiguration is needed [11]. 
Previous analysis of software problem reports from critical spacecraft systems showed that 
software testers repeatedly misunderstood required software behavior involving watermark 
variables [30] . In particular, confusions occurred when a watermark variable was set 
(because a new, highest value was reached), was reset (e.g., to zero), or was violated (e.g., 
when another variable's value reached the threshold watermark value, triggering some state 
change or action). Since requirements involving watermarks are important in high-criticality 
systems, and since their behavior has been shown to repeatedly confuse experienced users, 
they provide ahigh-yield application for our technique. 
This section applies the technique described in the previous section to explain some subtle 
requirements confusion, provide a requirements pattern, develop a formal specification to 
resolve the confusion, and exercise simulations of watermark uses and misuses. 
2.3.1 Step 1 -Identifying Common Requirements Confusion 
We here use two examples of requirements confusion involving watermarks taken from the 
software anomaly reports during testing of a critical system [30]. The first involved an 
unexpected software behavior when testers sent commands that they believed would reset the 
value of the high-watermark variable, PersistenceCountHighwater, to zero. Instead, the 
command that they sent ended up resetting another variable called PersistenceCount, which 
logs how long Spin Rate monitor has maintained its current state. Due to the gap between 
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expected and observed behaviors, the testers reported the observed behavior as being 
inconsistent with the requirements. In fact, the software was performing according to the 
specification. According to the system requirements, PersistenceCountHighwater stores the 
highest value of PersistenceCount and the two variables do not share a reset command. 
In another case of requirements confusion that occurred when using watermark variables, a 
thermal control monitor module checked to see if the high-watermark variable, Commanded 
persistence, had been violated (i.e., whether the temperature had been high for a period 
longer than the allowed limit). If this was the case, a command to turn off the heater was 
supposed to be issued. There was a corresponding low-watermark variable whose violation 
would lead to the heater being turned back on. According to the design, the system issued a 
command to turn off the heater if the temperature had been high (persistently) for a period 
equal to the value of the high-watermark. Testers noticed that after the heater-off command 
had been issued, changing the temperature command from high to low for a period less than 
that of high-watermark, followed by changing the temperature command back to high for a 
period equal to high-watermark, caused the system to issue a redundant heater-off command. 
This was not expected by the testers, and therefore an anomaly report was created. 
It was resolved later that the system was behaving as specified. The command to turn off the 
heater is based on another variable called HighLimitPersistenceCount reaching the 
watermark value. In this module, the temperature monitor is automatically turned on every 
60 seconds and this is asynchronous to the thermal command on/off. Once the monitor is on, 
it checks if temperature is high or low. If it is low, the value of HighLimitPersistenceCount 
is reset to zero. Therefore, the next time the temperature is set high for a period equal to 
high-watermark value, a command to turn off the heater is issued regardless of the previous 
heater command. All that is needed for the redundant heater-off command to be issued is for 
the variable HighLimitPersistenceCount to be reset to zero after the first heater-off 
command, and then be incremented up to the value of high-watermark. Asymmetrical low-
watermark variable and its corresponding LowLimitPersistenceCount variable are also 
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defined for this module. The role of LowLimitPersistenceCount is to keep count of 
consecutive low temperature and once low limit is violated, issue aheater-on command. 
2.3.2 Step 2 -Formulating Requirements Patterns 
In this step a pattern for watermarks is derived from the Requirements Pattern template 
presented in Section 2.2. The pattern outlines the main elements needed in specifying 
watermarks in any system and is described at a fairly high level of abstraction in order to 
cover diverse types and uses of watermarks. 
2.3.2.1 Watermark Requirements Pattern 
Table 2 lists and briefly describes the elements in the watermark pattern. Additional 
description of the key items follows the table. 
Table 2 -The watermark t~attern 
Element Description 
Pattern Name Watermark 
Classification Behavioral 
Intent Clarify the behavior of watermarks in the system. 
Motivation The behavior and use of watermarks has been a recurring cause of requirements 
confusion during testing of high-confidence systems. Watermarks are used to 
represent thresholds in the system, and therefore it important that the behavior 
involving them be clear and precise during all phases of software lifecycle. 
Applicability The watermark pattern is applicable to software systems that use watermarks, e.g., 
systems that employ monitoring software to detect states of the system that are of 
interest. 
Structure For each watermark defined in the system, (1) identify its type and the four 
possible sets of the "related" variables and (2) maintain the original relationships 
between the watermark and "related" variables in the formal specification. 
There are four basic types of watermarks: 
• Static high-watermark 
• Dynamic high-watermark 
• Static low-watermark 
• Dynamic low-watermark 
There are four sets of related variables for each watermark: affecting, affected, 
collaborating and don't care. See Structure for more details. 
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Table 2 -The watermark pattern (continued) 
Constraints Structural constraints: 
• Each watermark has a label in the specification. 
• A dynamic watermark can either be an SCR term or controlled variable 
(never a monitored variable). 
• Each dynamic watermark must have a corresponding reset mechanism. 
• A static watermark is to be defined as a constant. 
Behavioral constraints: 
• The initial value of each watermark is specified. 
• The value of dynamic high-watermark shall never decrease unless reset. 
• The value of dynamic low-watermark shall never increase unless reset. 
See Constraints for more detail. 
The next three subsections describe the Structure, Behavior, and Constraints portions of the 
requirements pattern in the context of developing a formal specification for the watermark 
pattern. 
Structure 
As mentioned in Table 2, there are four basic types of watermark variables: static high-
watermark, dynamic high-watermark, static low-watermark and dynamic low-watermark. 
Static watermarks are pre-determined before execution of the program, and do not change 
during execution. Dynamic watermarks change values during execution depending on events 
or states of the system. High-watermarks and low-watermarks represent maximum and 
minimum thresholds respectively. In the applications described here we cover all types of 
watermarks while concentrating more on dynamic watermarks due to the fact that they are 
more prone to misunderstandings. 
For each instance of a watermark in the system, we define four sets of related variables in 
that system as follows: 
• Affecting variables -variables which directly or indirectly determine the value of a 
dynamic watermark. By definition, static watermarks do not have affecting variables 
because they do not change value during runtime. The first example in Section 2.3.1 
provides an example of an affecting variable where PersistenceCount is an affecting 
variable of the watermark PersistenceCountHighwater. 
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• Affected variables -variables whose values are determined by a watermark OR by a 
collaborating variable reaching the value of a static high low-watermark. The second 
example in Section 2.3.1 provides an example of an affected variable where the 
heater-command is affected by violation of the watermarks. 
• Collaborating variables -variables in the system whose values are continuously 
compared to the value of the watermark. Their values do not have to affect the value 
of the watermark. However, when their values reach, exceed or go below that of the 
watermark, then the value of affected variables change. The second example in 
Section 2.3.1 provides an example of a collaborating variable where 
HighLimitPersistenceCount is a collaborating variable of the watermark Commanded 
persistence. 
• Don't care variables - these are variables that don't fall into any of the three 
categories above. This type of variables applies to both dynamic and static 
watermark variables. 
The sets affecting and affected have to be disjoint in any specification in order to avoid non-
determinism. Consider a specification consisting of a variable x which is both an affecting 
and affected variable for a particular watermark variable y. Such a specification is non-
deterministic because x is a function of y and y is a function of x. When both variables 
change at the same time (e.g., each variable is set by a different function), we can not resolve 
the resulting state for either of them deterministically. Non-determinism is an undesirable 
property in any high-confidence system, particularly safety-critical systems [25] and hence 
must be avoided. Therefore, an entity shall not be defined as an affecting and affected 
variable to the same watermark. The rest of the sets can overlap without causing non-
determinism. 
All four sets of variables apply to dynamic watermarks. However, affecting variables do not 
apply to static watermarks because static watermarks do not change during runtime. The 
table below summarizes the membership of the four sets above in relation to static and 
dynamic watermark variables. 
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Table 3 -Related variables set membership 
Watermark type Membership in related variable sets 
Collaborating Affecting Affected Don't cares 
Static Required Empty Required Optional 
Dynamic Optional Required Required Optional 
An entry "required" in the table above (Table 3) implies that at least one variable is in the set 
whereas an entry "optional" means that a set could be empty or contain one or more 
variables. Based on its usage, a dynamic watermark variable does not have to have 
corresponding collaborating variables) in order to affect another variable, hence the entry 
"optional" in the table. Whether this set is empty or filled with some variables depends on 
system design. As mentioned earlier, static watermarks do not change and therefore no 
system variable affects them, hence the entry "empty" in the table. The set of don't cares 
does not have any interaction with a specific watermark variable, and therefore its 
membership is irrelevant to a watermark variable under consideration. 
When discussing the four sets of related variables it is sufficient to talk about static and 
dynamic watermarks without referring to whether they represent high or low threshold. This 
is due to the fact that the three sets of variables will be related to each static watermark, 
regardless of whether the particular watermark represents high or low threshold. Similarly, 
four sets of variables will be related to each dynamic watermark, regardless of whether the 
particular watermark represents high or low threshold. 
Figure 3 represents the structure of interaction between a watermark variable of any type and 
the rest of system variables. Software system is represented as a set of variables. The 
variables that do not affect the behavior of watermark variable (the "don't care" variables) 
have been excluded from this diagram since they are irrelevant as far as a particular 
watermark variable is concerned. 
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Two types of abstract functions Read/LJpdate and Compare/LTpdate are used to clarify the 
structure of interaction between a watermark variable and the rest of system variables. Based 
on events and/or state of the system, a variable could be read or updated. The function 
ReadlLTpdate performs a read on a variable before it updates another. For example, a 
Read/LJpdate function will read the value of affecting variable and depending on the value 
read and system specification, the function will either update the watermark variable or leave 
it unchanged. The Compare/LJpdate function reads both watermark variable and 
collaborating variables) and compares them. Based on comparison and system 

























Figure 3 -Interaction between a watermark and related variables 
Behavior
We here expand on the five system-dependent behavioral requirements for each watermark 
(Table 2) by defining the behavior of dynamic watermarks in more detail. For simplicity, we 
assume that the initial and reset values are the same (since most applications take the same 
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approach). As a consequence of this assumption, a dynamic variable is defined in the formal 
model as an entity with two states: reset state (also initial state) and non-reset state. 
Assuming that the value of a dynamic high-watermark at time t; is v(t;), where t; > 0 and t;=i, 
we define initial value as v(to) = v(0). We now can state rules that any dynamic high-
watermark must obey: 
• The value v(t~) where j > 0 of the high-watermark during execution is always greater 
than or equal to v(0), i.e., (v(t~) > v(t~)). This implies that the value of high- 
watermark during execution can never be less than its initial value. 
• Condition [v(tk) > v(t~) > v(to)] where k > j > 0 always holds unless a reset command 
is issued. Once the value of high-watermark increases above the initial value, it 
either stays the same or increases. The only exception occurs when a reset command 
is issued where it assumes the initial value. 
• When reset command is issued, the high-watermark value returns to its initial value 
instantaneously. Analogous rules hold for low-watermarks. 
Figure 4 summarizes the behavior of both dynamic high-watermarks and low-watermarks. 
~~ 
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Figure 4 - Behavior of dynarrcic watermark variables 
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The definition of dynamic watermark behavior is based on our study of watermarks in 
several actual systems. It appears from this study that the behavior described in the 
watermark pattern applies to any specification that uses watermarks. Specifically, we can 
require that a dynamic high-watermark not decrement unless reset and that a dynamic low-
watermark not increment unless reset. The behavior of the remaining variables depends on 
specific system requirements. 
Constraints 
Table 2 outlined structural and behavioral constraints for watermarks in the system. The last 
two behavioral constraints can be checked using the SCRTooI and are the focus of this 
subsection. In this subsection we assume that there is a module that contains two watermark 
variables, high-watermark (HWM) and low-watermark (LWM), as well as two 
corresponding reset commands RESET_HWM and RESET_LWM. We show how we can 
represent the behavior for the dynamic watermarks defined in Figure 4 in SCR notation. This 
will become useful in the actual specifications involving dynamic watermarks as 
demonstrated in step 3. Note that in SCR notation the use of a single quote (') after the 
variable name indicates the value of the variable in the current state, whereas a lack of the 
single quote implies the previous state's value. For example HMW' is the current value of 
the high-watermark variable whereas HWM is its value in the previous state. 
The two behavioral constraints are restated and the corresponding SCR notations are 
represented as follows: 
• The value of dynamic high-watermark shall never decrease unless reset, i.e., 
(RESET_HWM' =OFF) _> (HWM' > HWM). 
• The value of dynamic low-watermark shall never increase unless reset, i.e., 
(RESET_LWM' =OFF) _> (LWM' < LWM). 
The two constraints defined in SCR notation above can be represented as assertions (using 
appropriate variable names) in any specification that uses dynamic high and low watermarks 
to ensure conformance to the required behavior as stated in the pattern. 
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2.3.2.2 Misuse Watermark Pattern 
A watermark pattern describes the proper structure and behavior for using watermarks in 
order to prevent requirements confusion. We also define a set of properties of a misuse 
pattern for a watermark. The misuse pattern specifies the requirements confusion that a 
watermark pattern is meant to mitigate. 
It is straightforward to see that a single requirements pattern can have one or more misuse 
patterns. For that reason we do not attempt to list all possible misuse watermark patterns, but 
instead define properties of misuse patterns based on anomaly reports (i.e., actual 
requirements confusion) as well as the structural and behavioral constraints defined in the 
pattern. Note that anomaly reports indicating requirements confusion can be categorized as 
structural or behavioral violations of the pattern constraints. 
From the abstract specification above we list three possible properties of a misuse watermark 
pattern: 
1. A command to reset persCount shall reset HWM, i.e., 
@T(RESET_persCount = ON) _> ((HWM > 0) _> (HWM'=0). 
2. The value of dynamic high-watermark can decrease without reset, i.e., 
(RESET_HWM' =OFF) _> (HWM' < HWM). 
3. The value of dynamic low-watermark can increase without reset, i.e., 
(RESET_LWM' =OFF) _> (LWM'> LWM). 
All three properties are undesirable because they violate constraints for dynamic watermarks 
and are sources of requirements confusion. The first misuse pattern is based on an actual 
report from testing of spacecraft flight software. In this report there was confusion between 
the command that resets a watermark variable and the one used to reset a persistent counter 
(a counter variable was used to determine the value of watermark variable). The SCR 
notation for the first misuse pattern states that when the command to reset the counter is 
issued, if the previous value of HWM is greater than zero, then the current value should be 
zero. It describes both structural misuse (since a wrong command is attempting to update the 
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watermark), and behavioral misuse (since an unexpected behavior is observed, i.e., the user 
will expect HWM to change but it will not). The last two properties of a misuse pattern are 
essentially behavioral and are derived from the constraints section of the pattern. The 
behavior of dynamic watermarks is subtle in that they either increment or decrement but not 
both, unless they are reset. Since watermarks tend to be confused with counters (which can 
count both up and down), it is reasonable to assume that a person who does not clearly 
understand the behavior of watermarks used in the system might incorrectly expect a HWM 
to decrement without a reset. 
A possible misuse pattern can have one or more of the three properties stated above. Thus, 
one way to create a misuse pattern is to take the valid watermark pattern and inject one of 
these three properties. This is a form of fault injection where the fault is injected not from an 
external component [33] but from a user's erroneous assumption. We will show how misuse 
patterns can be instantiated in the system through injection of the "bad" properties mentioned 
above and simulated to confirm that the behavior they represent does not exist in the SCR 
formal model. 
2.3.3 Applying the Watermark Pattern to Two Software Modules 
(Steps 3 and 4) 
In this section we apply the watermark pattern to the formal state-based specifications for the 
two modules named Fault Protection Module (FPM) and Thermal Control Module (TCM) 
mentioned in the two examples described in Section 2.3.1. Application of the pattern 
involves steps 3 and 4 of our technique for resolving requirements confusions, i.e., formal 
specification and distribution simulation. Application of the watermark pattern to the FPM is 
discussed in Section 2.3.3.1 followed by application to the TCM (Section 2.3.3.2). In this 
section both textual and SCR specification notations are used. Elements in the actual SCR 
specification (variables, modes, etc.) are highlighted using Courier New Font. 
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2.3.3.1 Applying the Watermark Pattern to the FPM 
The specification for this module is created using guidelines from the watermark pattern. 
Simulation of the resulting specification is run for observation in order to resolve any 
requirements confusion. The two steps are described in detail below. 
Step 3 -Formally Specifying Software Requirements Using Guidelines from the 
Pattern 
The watermark pattern is instantiated on the watermark (PersistenceCountHighwater) which 
was one of the variables in the FPM. Instantiation is performed through guidelines provided 
by the pattern's structure and behavior sections. We then check the resulting specification 
using properties defined in the constraints section of the pattern. 
A watermark variable PersistenceCountHighwater (named cPersCountHWM in the SCR 
specification) is used to keep track of the highest value of another variable called 
PersistenceCount (cPersCount in the SCR specification). PersistenceCount keeps track 
of how long the spin rate monitor has been in a particular state. Therefore, 
PersistenceCountHighwater represents the longest time the Spin Rate monitor state has been 
stable. 
Structure 
The Structure section for the watermark pattern addresses two issues; the "Type" of the 
watermark variable used in the system and the set of "related" variables, i.e., affecting, 
affected, collaborating, and don't care variables. In specifying the module formally, we 
follow the guidelines from the structure section by identifying the type and related variables. 
Type 
Based on the behavioral requirements for this particular instance of a watermark, the 
PersistenceCountHighwater is declared to be a dynamic high-watermark in the SCR 
specification. Note that "dynamic high-watermark" is not a defined type in SCRTooI and 
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therefore we define it as an integer, and then indicate that it is a dynamic high-watermark in 
the comments section of the variable dictionary. 
Related System Variables 
Since PersistenceCountHighwater is defined as a dynamic high-watermark in the system, the 
watermark pattern calls for the definition of the relationships among: 
• Variables in the system that affect the behavior of PersistenceCountHighwater. 
• Variables in the system that are affected by PersistenceCountHighwater. 
• Variables in the system that collaborate with PersistenceCountHighwater. 
Based on the requirements for this module, PersistenceCountHighwater directly depends on 
the following variables : PersistenceCount (c P e r s C oun t ), and command CLEAR_HWM . 
In the formal specification, the watermark variable depends on command 
RESET_SPINRATE indirectly . These two commands are defined as monitored variables 
in the SCR specification because their values originate directly from the environment, while 
PersistenceCount and PersistenceCountHighwater are defined as controlled variables since 
their values rely on monitored variables and other decisions defined in the specification. 
Therefore, we can consider the three variables c P e r s C oun t, CLEAR_HWM and 
RE S ET_S P I NRAT E as affecting variables for the watermark variable cPersCountHWM in 
the specification. 
By defining cPersCountHWM as a controlled variable, we fulfill the structural constraint 
for dynamic watermark defined in the pattern which states that a dynamic watermark shall be 
defined as a term or controlled variable. The rest of the structural constraints are met as well 
since we have defined the corresponding reset function (through the command CLEAR_HWM) 
and have comments to indicate that cPersCountHWM is a watermark. 
Discussion of the set of variables that are affected by this watermark variable is omitted in 
order to simplify the model and focus on the part where requirements confusion occurred. 
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The set of collaborating variables for PersistenceCoirntHWM is undefined and therefore 
assumed to be empty. 
In creating the SCR specification, we add two mode classes, counterStatus and 
hwmStatus, in order to represent the behavior of the counter and watermark variables, 
respectively. Figure 5 shows an SCR dependency graph for PersistenceCoi~fitHighwater 
(cPersCountHWM). Dependency is represented by an arrow pointing from the dependent 
entity to the entity that it depends on. For example, cPersCountHWM depends on variable 
cPersCount, and two mode classes hwmStatus and counterStatus . Note that the 
dependency graph in SCR specification is slightly different from the original dependencies 
defined in the textual requirements due to the introduction of mode classes and other SCR 
constructs. The new entities were introduced in order to simplify and clarify the 
specification, and their existence does not affect the original dependences. 
Dependency Graph Window _ .. . 
Fle Options 
countarStatus 
"new" dependencies drawn 
c:F'~:rsi.<~unt p~_•~~.:=; ;~_intH~~': t.t 
Figure 5 -Dependency graph for PersistenceCoitntHighwater (cPers Co un tHWM) 
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Behavior 
The Behavior section according to the watermark pattern addresses five behavioral 
requirements: 
1. Initial value of the watermark. 
2. Behavior of collaborating variable(s). 
3. A method for updating a (dynamic) watermark. 
4. A method for updating affected variable(s). 
5. Reset value (for dynamic watermark). 
Since affected and collaborating variables are not defined in the requirements involving this 
watermark variable (cPersCountHWM), only requirements 1, 3, and 5 apply here. 
Initial and Reset Values 
Based on this particular module's requirements, both the initial and reset values for 
PersistenceCountHighwater (cPers Coun tHWM) are 0. The initial value is specified when 
the variable cPersCountHWM is defined in the S CRTooI' s variable dictionary. The reset 
value for cPersCountHWM is specified in the event table that describes its behavior. 
Method for Updating PersistenceCountHighwater 
In this section we discuss how PersistenceCountHighwater is updated keeping in mind the 
pattern's guidelines. The requirements confusion arose from the fact that if 
PersistenceCount is reset to zero and no command to reset PersistenceCountHighwater is 
issued, then PersistenceCountHighwater retains the last highest value of PersistenceCount 
instead of becoming zero as well. On the other hand, if PersistenceCountHighwater is reset 
while PersistenceCount is not changed, then PersistenceCount will continue to increase and 
once the PersistenceCountHighwater reset command is off, the PersistenceCountHighwater 
variable will continue to keep track of the highest value of PersistenceCount. 
Since the high-watermark variable in this system is dependent on other entities, we describe 
the behavior of those entities first before describing the behavior of the watermark itself. 
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These entities include a mode class named counterStatus, the controlled variable 
named cPersCount and a mode class named hwmStatus . The discussion of the 
behavior of these entities follows below: 
• counterStatus 
This mode class determines the behavior of the controlled variable cPersCount as 
illustrated by the dependency diagram in Figure 5. On the other hand this mode class 
depends (partially) on another mode class named resetSpinStatus which is not 
discussed here. The role of resetSpinStatus mode class is to keep track of the 
state of the command for resetting the spin rate monitor. The mode class 
counterStatus consists of two modes: initialCountMode and 
currentCountMode. By default this mode class is in initialCountMode. 
The transition from initialCountMode to currentCountMode occurs when 
the reset command for the spin rate monitor is Disabled (represented by 
@T(resetSpinStatus=nonResetMode)) or when time changes while the particular 
reset command is in Disabled state. Conversely, counterStatus transitions from 
currentCountMode to initialCountMode when mSpinRate changes or 
the command to reset the monitor is set to True (from being False). 
~~'cdunter5tatus h~ode_Transition Function 
TYPE+ QISJT COVG 
Name ~_ ~ ~unterStatus 
S'Qurace h$c~d~' 
" initialCaur-~tt,~t~ ~d 
counterStatus Mode Transition Function 
Events ~: ~r~ h~'a~• 
((auC{mSpinRate} ~ OR initialCountMode 
~arT(resetSpinStatus= resetMode} 
-~~~ _ ~ ~ .r~-
r ~T(resetSpinStatus=nonResetMode} ~ currentCountMode 
OR aC(mTime) UVHEN ~-: 
tvresetSpinStatus = nonResetMade} 
Figure 6 -Mode transition table for counterStatus 
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• cPers Co un >r 
This controlled variable depends on the mode class counterStatus described 
previously. Initially, the value of this variable is zero. It gets updated as shown by 
the event table in Figure 7. 







cPersCount Event Function 
Defines a Controlled Variable 
T(counterStatus = 
initialCountMode} 
~a7T(counterStatus = currentCountMode} OR ~a C(mTime} 
WHEN (counterStatus = currentGountMotle} 
cPersCount+l 
Figure 7 -Event table for cPersCoun t 
The moment that counterStatus enters initialCountMode, cPersCount 
is reset to zero. Otherwise, if counterStatus enters currentCountMode, or 
if it is in currentCountMode when time changes, then cPersCount is 
incremented by one. Initially counterStatus mode class is in 
initialCountMode, and therefore corresponds to the initial value of 
cPersCount. 
• hwmSta >: us 
Figure 8 describes the mode transitions for the hwmStatus mode class which 
determines how c P e r s C oun t HWM is updated. There are two modes for 
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hwmStatus, initialHWNIl~lode and currentHWNIl~lode. Initially, 
hwmStatus is in initialHWNINIode. When a command CLEAR HWM is set to 
False from True, or if it stays at False while time changes then the destination mode 
is currentHWNIl~lode. On the other hand if hwmStatus is in currentHTnTMMode 
and CLEAR_HWM is set to True, hwmStatus is set to initialHWMMode. As we 
shall see later, i n i t i a 1 HwMMo de corresponds to the reset value of 
cPersCountHWM while currentHWMMode corresponds to non-reset values. 
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hwmStatus Mode Transition Function 
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(CLR_SPN_MON_HVUM =False) 
~T(CLR_SPN_MuN_HVUhr1= Truej initialHVUMMode 
Figure 8 -Mode transition function for hwmSta tus mode class 
The previous paragraphs describe the behavior of counterStatus, cPersCount and 
hwmStatus, the three entities that the watermark (cPersCountHWM) depends on. We 
now describe the behavior of cPersCountHWM. The event function in Figure 9 shows how 
the watermark is updated. As the table shows, this variable can either be reset to zero or 
updated to the current value of cPersCount . 
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The condition for resetting cPersCountHWM is represented in SCR as 
@T(hwmStatus=initialHWMMode). This implies that hwmStatus was in 
currentHWMMode in the previous state and is now in initialHWMMode. Furthermore, 
this scenario corresponds to the command CLEAR_HWM having the value False (not set) in 
the previous state and value True (set) in the current state. 
Conversely, the value of cPersCountHWM can be incremented under two sets of 
conditions. The first one is when hwmStatus transitions from initialHWMMode to 
currentHWMMode. This corresponds to the value of CLEAR_HWM becoming False in the 
current state whereas it was True in the previous state. The second condition is when the 
value of cPersCount increases above cPersCountHWM while hwmStatus is still in 
currentHWMMode. The SCR sub-statement @C (cPersCount) WHEN 
(cPersCount >— cPersCountHWM) takes care of the case where cPersCount gets 
reset while the corresponding watermark is not and hence ensures that the dynamic high-
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cPersCountHWM Event Function 
Defines a Controlled variable 
h~Cdes ' ~e~s 
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Figure 9 -Event table for the watermark cPersCoun tHWM 
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The specification created above represents the precise behavior of the software module and 
also demonstrates an instantiation of the watermark pattern to a specification. Using the 
watermark pattern assists in creation of the specification in a systematic manner, and also 
clarifies the potentially confusing behavior that surrounds watermarks and their related 
variables. Through the process of instantiation of the watermark pattern, we gain confidence 
that the resulting specification is correct as far as usage of the watermark is concerned. We 
performed a manual check of correctness by stepping through the list of constraints in the 
constraints section of the watermark pattern to verify that the specification covered all the 
applicable properties. In addition, tool assisted verification was performed as discussed in 
the next section. 
Using the Pattern's Constraints to Check the Executable Specification 
The constraints section for the watermark pattern defines structural and behavioral 
constraints for all types of watermarks. Since PersistenceCountHighwater is a dynamic 
watermark, the following specific constraints apply to the module specification where this 
variable is used: 
Structural Constraints 
1. PersistenceCountHighwaterhas alabel in the specification. 
2. PersistenceCountHighwater can either be an SCR term or controlled variable (never 
a monitored variable). 
3. PersistenceCountHighwater rnusthave acorresponding reset mechanism. 
Behavioral Constraints 
4. The initial value of PersistenceCountHighwater is specified. 
5. The value of PersistenceCountHighwater shall never decrease unless reset. 
Constraints 1-3 are checked manually through inspection of the SCR specification for this 
module. Constraint 1 is satisfied by observing that a comment in variable dictionary where 
this variable is defined indicates that it is a dynamic high-watermark variable. Constraint 2 is 
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satisfied by observing that this variable is defined as a controlled variable in the 
specification. Constraint 3 is satisfied by observing that an event function is defined for this 
variable, and that there is a transition to the reset value (defined as 0) as shown in Figure 7. 
Constraint 4 is enforced by the SCRTooI. Each variable defined in SCR specification must 
have an initial value, unless the variable is defined by a condition table. 
Constraint 5 can be checked automatically in the specification using the assertion checking 
capability of the SCRTooI. We specify the constraint as: (CLEAR_HWM' =False) _> 
(cPersCountHWM' >= cPersCountHWM). This states that whenever the current value of 
reset signal (CLEAR_HWM') is False, i.e., not set, then the current value of high-watermark 
variable (cPersCountHWM') is greater than or equal to its value in the previous state. This 
statement correctly captures the required behavior of the dynamic high-watermark. Running 
the simulation of the specification with this assertion enabled causes no violation for the 
scenarios tested. 
►Step 4 -Distributing and Simulating the Executable Specification 
After formally specifying the module where requirements confusion occurred, we ran a 
simulation to show the correct behavior of the watermark (cPersCountHWM) in this 
module. The simulation data was obtained through heuristics to check for boundary 
conditions, and also from the scenarios that led to the requirements confusion described 
earlier. By creating the test scenario that caused the confusion, we can be sure that our 
specification does not exhibit the undesirable behavior. 
Simulation in SCR involves a list of monitored variables, terms and controlled variables. 
Monitored variables appear on the left hand side of the simulation window, while terms and 
controlled variables appear on the right hand side. The simulation can be driven by an event 
file which consists of a list of monitored variables with changing values. Terms and 
controlled variables change value based on how the specification behavior is defined. At the 
beginning of the simulation, all monitored variables, terms, and controlled variables are 
displayed. As the simulation progresses, only variables whose values change are displayed. 
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Therefore, if a term or controlled variable does not change in a particular state, then it will 
not be listed in that state. 
Note that the simulation does not perform exhaustive checking. Our goal is to establish a 
pattern for specifying watermark variables and to provide an executable model for simulating 
and exploring testers or operators' assumptions. If exhaustive checking is required, then a 
model checker (e.g., SPIN or SMV) is more appropriate. 
Using the executable specification we can guarantee the following: 
1. Each constraint on a dynamic high-watermark defined in the constraints section of the 
watermark requirements pattern is satisfied by the specification. 
2. The erroneous behavior expected by users does not exist in the specification. 
The first guarantee was discussed in the previous step. The second guarantee is described 
below. 
Representing Users' Expected Behavior Through Assertions 
One anomaly report involving watermarks described a case where testers expected the value 
of high-watermark (cPersCountHWM) to be reset to zero through sending a command 
RESET_SPINR.ATE. However, this command was designed to reset the persistence count 
variable instead of the high-watermark. The behavior erroneously expected by the testers is 
represented in the SCR specification by the following assertion: 
@T(RESET_SPINR.ATE=True) WHEN (cPersCountHWM > 0) 
(cPersCountHWM' = 0) 
_> 
This assertion is an instantiation of the misuse watermark pattern discussed previously. The 
assertion uses one of the undesired properties that violate constraints on dynamic watermark 
variables. The statement captures the tester's expectations correctly because 
cPersCountHWM is assumed to be in the non-reset state (i.e., cPersCountHWM > 0) 
before RESET_SPINR.ATE command becomes set (True). When RESET_SPINRATE is 
set, cPersCountHWM is reset to zero as they had expected. 
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Specifying this as an assertion and then running the simulation causes a violation as shown in 
Figure 10. Note that in state 15, both cPersCount and cPersCountHwM have the value 
of 6 but after RESET_SPINRATE command was set to True (state 16), cPersCount was 
reset to zero while cPersCountHWM remained the same (by its absence on the list of 
changing variables in that state). Since the assertion requires cPersCountHWM to be reset 
when RESET_SPINRATE command is True, the SCR simulator detects a violation and flags 
an error as shown in the simulation. This signifies that the behavior that the testers had 
expected is not correct. 
Negating the conclusion of the statement that represents user's expected behavior yields the 
following statement: 
@T(RESET_SPINRATE=True) WHEN (cPersCountHWM > 0) _> NOT 
(cPersCountHWM' = 0) 
By the statement above, we are asserting that if RESET_SPINRATE command is set while 
cPersCountHWM > 0, then cPersCountHWM will not be reset to 0. Running the 
simulation against this assertion does not cause a violation. This gives us confidence that our 
specification does not have the faulty behavior. 
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File Settings 11h~ndow 
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rnTime = 1G cPersCount = 5 
cPersCountHWt+7 = 5 
--- State 15 
mTime = 11 cPersCaunt = 6 
cPersCountHTnJM = 6 
--- State 16 
SPECIFIC~TICIN ASSII~TION FAILID: C.Ieat~H~r~~'M 
FtESET_SPNRATE_FP = true 
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mTime = 1~ 
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resetSpinStatus = resetMode 
counterStatus = initialCountN]ode 
cPersCaunt = G 
Figure 10 -Running the simulation with testers' assertion 
2.3.3.2 Applying the Watermark Pattern to the TCM 
Similar to Section 2.3.3.1 we create the specification for the TCM using guidelines from the 
watermark pattern. Simulation of the resulting specification is run for observation in order to 
resolve any requirements confusion. The two steps are described in detail below. 
Step 3 -Formally Specifying TCM Requirements Using Guidelines from the Pattern 
Two static watermark variables are used in this module, commanded persistence high limit 
(named CP_HWM in the SCR specification) and commanded persistence low limit (named 
CP_LWM in the SCR specification). In this discussion we will use the SCR names instead of 
the original variable names for convenience purposes. The suffixes HWM and LWM in the SCR 
names refer to high watermark and low watermark respectively. 
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CP_HWM is used to represent the longest time (in minutes) that the temperature can be high 
before cheater-off command is issued. Conversely, CP_LWM is used to represent the longest 
time (in minutes) that the temperature can be low before heater-on command is issued. We 
instantiate the watermark pattern to the two variables in this module through structure and 
behavior guidelines and then use the constraints to ensure that the resulting specification 
satisfies the pattern. Instantiation of the watermark pattern on the two variables is performed 
concurrently since the two variables are in the same module. 
Structure 
In structure section, we address two issues, type of the watermark variables and the sets of 
"related" variables for each of the watermark variables. 
Type 
Based on the textual requirements description for the TCM, CP_HWM and CP_LWM are 
declared to be static high watermark and static low watermark variables respectively in the 
SCR specification. Since "watermark" is not an SCR base type and both CP_HWM and 
CP_LWM represent integral values, we declare them as integers and enter the type in the 
description section of the constant dictionary as shown in Figure 11 to indicate that they are 
watermarks . Note that CP_HWM and CP_LWM are entered in the constant dictionary in order 
to fulfill one of the structural constraints. 
Related System Variables 
Both watermark variables are static and therefore the watermark template calls for clear 
understanding of the relationship between: 
• Collaborating variables 
~ Affected variables 
Affecting variables do not apply to these watermarks since the two watermarks do not change 
during runtime. Don't care variables are not discussed because they don't make any 
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Figure 11 - CP HWMand CP LWMentries in constant dictionary 
Based on the TCM requirements, both C P_HWM and C P_Lv~TM share three variables, 
temperature command (mTempCmd), heater command (cHeaterCmd) and temperature 
monitor (mTime). The first two are collaboratr~lg variables while the last is an affected 
variable. Temperature command is a command to the heater which sets the temperature to 
either high or low. Heater command turns the heater on or off and temperature monitor runs 
every 60 seconds (1 minute) and checks the value of temperature command. We use mT ime 
in the SCR specification to represent the action of temperature monitor being turned on and 
we use one unit to represent one minute. Beside the three shared variables, the two 
watermarks have the following related variables separately: 
• CP_HWM has a collaborati~ig variable called high li~riit persistence count (tHLPC). 
The purpose of tHLPC is to keep count of how long mTempCmd has had the value 
high persistently. tHLPC has a coi-responding reset command (mRESET_HLPC) 
which resets tHLPC to zero. 
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~ CP_LWM has a collaborating variable called low limit persistence count (tLLPC). 
The purpose of tLLPC is to keep count of how long mTempCmd has had the value 
low persistently. tLLPC has a corresponding reset command (mRESET_LLPC) 
which resets tLLPC to zero. 
Temperature monitor runs every 60 seconds and checks the value of temperature command 
which can be high or low. If the state of temperature command is high, then the value of 
tHLPC will be incremented while the value of tLLPC will be reset to zero. On the other 
hand, if the temperature command is low, then tHLPC will be reset to zero while the value of 
tLLPC will be incremented. 
Successive temperature command levels may cause one of the two persistence counters to 
increment and reach the value of its corresponding watermark variable. For example, if 
tHLPC reaches the value of CP_HVV~ then heater command variable (cHeaterCmd) is set 
to OFF. Similarly, if tLLPC reaches the value of CP_LWM then cHeaterCmd is set to ON. 
It is obvious from this description that cHeaterCmd is an affected variable for both 
watermark variables. 
Two variables that were not defined in the original module's requirements were added in our 
formal specification to explicitly show the issuance of redundant Heater-ON or Heater-OFF 
commands by the software. The controlled variable cHeaterCmd is not suitable to show 
issuance of a redundant command because S CRTooI' s design does not consider assignment 
of the same value to a controlled variable or a term as an event. For example, if 
cHeaterCmd =OFF in the previous state and it gets assigned the same value OFF in the 
current state, SCRTooI will report no change during simulation and therefore it is hard to 
distinguish whether the value OFF was from the previous state or current state. We add two 
controlled variables c Rdn t 0 F F Cmd and c Rdn t ONCmd to keep track of the redundant 
commands as well as displaying them during simulation. The two controlled variables 
directly depend on cHeaterCmd. 
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Figure 12 is SCR dependency graph that summarizes the relationship between the entities in 
the Thermal Control Module. 
Dependency Uraiph V'~lindowe 
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Figure 12 -Dependency graph for the Touchdown Monitor 
b 
Note that the watermarks are not shown in the dependency graph. This is due to the fact that 
the watermarks in questions are static and hence do not cause events in the system. 
However, the collaborating variables (t HL PC and t LL PC) , affected variables 
(cHeaterCmd, cRdntONCmd and cRdntOFFCmd) and monitored variables are 
shown since they are involved in the system events. 
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Behavior
Of the five behavioral requirements from the watermark pattern, the following are needed for 
C P_xWM and C P_LvuM in the specification: 
• Initial values. 
• Behavior of collaborating variables. 
• Methods for updating affected variable(s). 
The last two items on the list above are discussed together for each watermark since the 
behavior of collaborating variables determines how affected variables are updated. 
Initial Values 
The initial (and also final) values for the two watermarks were set to 3 minutes per original 
requirements. This can be seen on the third column of their declaration on Figure 11. 
Behavior of Collaborating Variables 
Two SCR terms are defined for the two collaborating variables for this module as described 
below. 
tLLPC 
This collaborating variable is defined as a term in the specification. It is intended to keep 
track of how long the temperature command has been at a low state. Figure 13 summarizes 
the behavior of this term. 
The term t LL PC has two main states, reset (value = 0) and non-reset (value > 0). Initially, 
t is term is in reset state. When temperature monitor runs (represented by @C (mTime) ) 
while both the temperature command is low, and the reset command is not active, then this 
term will increment, and hence enter or remain in the non-reset state. This scenario is 
represented by the rightmost column of the table in Figure 13. On the other hand, if reset 
command is activated (i.e., assigned the value True) or temperature monitor runs while 
temperature command is high, then tLLPC will go to reset state or remain in reset state. 
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Figure 13 -Event function for low limit persistence count 
tHLPC 
Similar to the variable discussed above, tHLPC is defined as a term in the specification. 
However, it is used to keep track of how long the temperature command has been high. 
Figure 14 summarizes the behavior of this variable. 
The term tHLPC (Figure 14) has two states, reset and non-reset, similar to tLLPC. 
Furthermore, it has a reset command (mRESET_HLPC) which is defined as a monitored 
variable. When reset command is activated the term goes to reset state or remains in the reset 
state. The condition leading to the increase in value for this term is opposite to that of 
tLLPC. As the rightmost column of the table in Figure 14 illustrates, tHLPC is incremented 
when temperature monitor runs while the temperature command is high as opposed to low. 
Of course the reset command has to be inactivated for the increment to occur. 
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Figure 14 - Event fi~nctio~2 for high limit persistence count 
Methods for Updating Affected Variables 
Only one controlled variable (cHeaterCmd) is defined in the original requirements for the 
thermal control module. However, for the purpose of specification clarity we defined two 
more controlled variables along with cHeaterCmd . As mentioned earlier these controlled 
variables are also affected variables as far as watermarks for this module are concerned. The 
discussion of the behavior of the affected/controlled variables follows below. 
cHeaterCmd 
This controlled variable is affected by the two collaborating variables tHLPC and tLLPC 
for the watermarks C P_HWM and C P_LWM respectively. Figure 15 illustrates the behavior for 
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this variable. Initially, cHeaterCmd is OFF (not shown in the diagram). When the value 
of tLLPC reaches that of its corresponding watermark (rightmost column), heater command 
is set to ON, otherwise it stays off. On the other hand if the heater command is ON and 
tHLPC reaches the value of its corresponding watermark then the heater command is set to 
OFF as the middle column illustrates. Note that the heater command stays in its current state 
until a transition to a different state occurs. 
5Ck cH~~t+~rCmd E~er~t Functic►n 
Name ';cH~ater~md
rHeater~'md'= 
cHeaterCmd Event Function 
Defines a Contre~lled Variable 
~ST~titH LF' C-= ~ ;~ F'_H'ti~'~IhA~ 
Figure 15 - Event fi~yiction for the heater command 
cR do t ONCm d 
This is one of the variables introduced in the specification for clarity purposes. It keeps track 
of redundant heater-ON commands and has two values Trice and False. The value True 
implies that a redundant ON command has been issued while the value False implies the 
opposite. The initial value is False. Figure 16 illustrates the behavior of this variable. 
According to the TCM requirements, a redundant ON command is issued when tLLPC 
reaches the value of its corresponding watermark (C P_LWM) while the heater command is 
ON. The middle column of the table in Figure 16 represents this behavior. The redundant 
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ON command is represented by assigning the value True to the controlled variable 
cRdntONCmd. 
Stp eF~~intt~NCmd E~~nt Function 
TYPE+ DISJ 
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Figure 16 -Keeping truck of redundant ON commands 
The rightmost column represents a case where the redundant ON command is reset to False. 
We consider a redundant command to be a signal that indicates when the heater command 
has been assigned the same value for the second or more time consecutively. For that reason 
assignment of the value Trice to cRdntONCmd does not hold for an extended period of time 
but gets reset at the earliest opportunity. This occurs immediately after the value of tLLPC 
becomes something other than the watermark while the heater command is ON, i.e., when it 
increases beyond the watermark value or gets reset. This strategy makes the specification 
more realistic and avoids the problem of SCR simulator failing to display a second redundant 
53 
ON command being issued since the value of cRdntONCmd will be True hence implying no 
change to it. Furthermore, the value of cHeaterCmd will not change from being ON to 
OFF without tLLPC changing first (from being equal to its corresponding watermark) and 
hence the condition used to reset the redundant ON command is sufficient. 
cRdn tOFFCmd 
This variable is used to keep track of redundant OFF commands have been issued by the 
software. Its behavior is similar to that of cRdntONCmd and is summarized by Figure 17 
below. 
cRdntOFFCmd E~rent Function 









Figure 17 -Keeping track of redundant OFF commands 
The redundant OFF command is set to True when the value of tHLPC reaches that of its 
corresponding watermark while the heater command is in OFF state. Symmetrically, the 
redundant OFF command is reset to False when the value of tHLPC becomes something 
other than the value of its corresponding watermark. 
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Using the Pattern's Constraints to Check the Executable Specification 
In this section we use applicable constraints to the two watermarks C P_HWM and C P_LWM. 
Since both watermarks are static the following constraints apply: 
Structural Constraints 
1. Both watermarks must have label in the specification. 
2. Both watermarks must be defined as constants . 
Behavioral Constraints 
1. The initial values of each watermark must be specified. 
Through manual inspection we verify that all constraints are satisfied. The behavioral 
constraint is supported by the SCRTooI since a constant cannot be defined in the 
specification without being assigned a value. Note that the constraints for static watermarks 
are rather simple compared to dynamic watermarks. 
Step 4 -Distributing and Simulating the Executable Specification 
After formal specification, an executable specification was created and simulations were run 
to observe the behavior. Simulation data was obtained through heuristics as well as actual 
test scenario described in the report in Section 2.3.1. Through simulation we can guarantee 
that the behavior experienced by testers does not exist in the specification. This guarantee is 
discussed in detail below. 
Representing User's Expected Behavior Through Assertions 
The anomaly report involving watermarks for this module describes how testers 
unexpectedly observed a redundant heater-OFF command being issued by the software. The 
testers knew that aheater-OFF command (non-redundant) would be issued when the value of 
persistence count reached that of the high watermark, i.e., tHLPC=CP_HWM, which was set 
at 3 minutes . 
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The testers expected the following sequence of events to occur before a redundant OFF 
command is issued: 
1. The value of tHLPC reaches that of CP HWM and software issues an OFF command. 
2. Temperature is commanded low for at least C P_HWM minutes. 
3 . Temperature is commanded high for C P_HWM minutes. 
4. A redundant heater-OFF command is issued. 
The sequence of events listed above can be summarized by a graph in Figure 18. The 
horizontal axis represents time while the vertical axis represents the state of the temperature 
readings, i.e., high or low. Assuming that the heater command was issued at time = 0, the 
redundant heater OFF command was supposed to be issued at time = 6 as long as the 






Figure 18 -Sequence of events expected to cause a redundant OFF command 
Based on Figure 18, modeling the testers' expected behavior requires at least six states and 
therefore a trivial logic statement will not be sufficient. We therefore represent this behavior 
using a mode class named Us erBehavi or along with an assertion named 
ExpectedRdntOFF . The mode class consists of eight modes as described below: 
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• Neu t ra 1 mode -this is the default state and represents a situation where all initial 
conditions required to start tracking the expected behavior have not been satisfied. 
The required conditions are (1) mTempCmd = HIGH and 
(2) tHLPC = CP_HWM (where CP_HWM = 3 minutes). 
• Ini t mode -this is the initial state in tracking the expected behavior. It follows 
immediately from the Neutral mode once the required conditions have been met. 
• F i r s t L ow mode -this mode follows the I n i t mode and repres ents a cas e where 
the temperature monitor has run and observed that the temperature was low. 
• SecondLow mode -follows F i rs tLow mode and represents a case where the 
monitor has run and observed that the temperature was low. 
• ThirdLow mode -follows SecondLow mode and represents a case where the 
monitor has run and observed that the temperature was low. 
• F i rs tHi gh mode -follows Thi rdLow and represents a case where the monitor 
has run and observed that the temperature was high. 
• SecondHigh mode -follows FirstHigh and represents a case where the monitor 
has run and observed that the temperature was high. 
• Thi rdHi gh mode -follows SecondHigh and represents a case where the monitor 
has run and observed that the temperature was high. 
Figure 19 is the mode transition table for the mode class Us erBehavi or . It provides a 
graphical representation for the mode transitions described above. Note that when conditions 
are violated while in any mode the mode class transitions to Neutral mode. For example, 
if the mode class is in SecondLow and the temperature is low, then destination is 
Thi rdLow mode. However, if the temperature is high (instead of low) then the destination 
mode is Neutral. 
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UserBehavior Mode Transition Function 
Etitin~ts ~c S~/tQafil7n ?l~~ 
(a7T{mTempCmd=LOW) WHEfV { tHLPC=CP_HWM) InitL~ ~~~,~ 
Ler~C{mTime} WHEN {mTempCmd=LOW} FirstLow 
~C{mTime} WHEN (mTempCmd=LOW) SecondLow 
~C{mTime} WHEN {mTempGmd=LOW} ThirdLo~r 
@C{mTime} WHEN {mTempGmd=HIGH) FirstHigh 
@C(mTime} WHEN (mTempCmd=HIGH) SecondHigh 
t~C(mTime} WHEN (mTempGmd=HIGH) ThirdHigh 
@G{mTime) WHEN mTempCmd=HIGH) Neutral 
z,C{mTime} WHEN {mTempGmd=HIGH) Neutral. 
i~li:{rnTirne) WHEN {mTempGmd=HIGH} Neutral 
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Figure 19 -Mode transition table for the UserBehavior mode class 
Based on the testers' expected behavior, the system was supposed to transition through all 
the states listed above (in order), before a redundant OFF command is issued once the final 
state (ThirdHigh mode) is reached. The event of reaching the final state and issuing the 
redundant OFF command is represented by the assertion named ExpectedRndtOFF as 
described below: 
@T(UserBehavior =ThirdHigh) _> (cRdntOFFCmd' =True) 
The assertion above states that a redundant command will be issued when the entire sequence 
of expected behavior has been completed, i.e., the mode class UserBehavior enters 
ThirdHigh mode. Note the use of the single quote after the name cRdntOFFCmd. It 
indicates that the value being checked is the value of the variable in the current state. 
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First we ran the simulation using the assertion Exp e c t e dRdn t O F F and the scenario that 
the testers used when they encountered an unexpected behavior. Using this scenario, the 
temperature is commanded low for less than C P_HWl~ minutes ~ (in this case 2 minutes), after 
the first heater OFF command and then high for C P_HWM minutes. A redundant OFF 
command is issued and no assertion violation is observed. The assertion is not violated 
because the sequence of events ends with the assertion being satisfied trivially since the 
premise is False. When the temperature is commanded low for two minutes after the 
issuance of the OFF command, the state of Us erBehavi or is in S econdLow state while 
the value of tHLPC remains at 0. Setting the temperature back to high causes the state of 
Us erB ehav i o r to go to neutral state while the value of tHL PC becomes 1. In the next 
two minutes Us erBehavi or stays in neutral state because the value of tHLPC is still not 
equal to 3 and cHeaterCmd does not change to OFF. When the value of tHLPC becomes 
3, a redundant OFF command is issued. However Us erBehavi or is still not in 
Thi rdHi gh state (it just enters Ini t mode), and therefore the assertion holds trivially 
regardless of the state of c Rdn t O F F Cmd. 
Next we run the simulation using the same assertion but this time we use the sequence of 
events that the testers believed would cause the software to issue a redundant OFF command. 
This scenario causes a violation of the assertion as illustrated by Figure 20. 
The initial state of the simulation in Figure 20 shows the redundant OFF command 
(c Rdn t O F F Cmd) being in False state, and the mode class U s e rB ehav i o r being in neutral 
state. The violation occurs in state 12 when Us e rB ehav i o r enters Th i rdH i gh mode 
(the expected sequence of events is complete), while the actual state of c Rdn t O F F Cmd is 
False as opposed to the expected value of True. Although the value of c Rdn t O F F Cmd is 
not displayed in state 12, we know it is False because it did not change in any state since the 
initial state. Furthermore, the violation of the assertion confirms that the redundant OFF 
command is still False. 
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Figure 20 -Running simitilatiori with expected behavior 
The violation is indicative of a logic error in the expected behavior. The testers expected the 
temperature to be commanded low for C P_HWM minutes (after a heater OFF command has 
been issued) and then back to high for C P_HWM minutes before a redundant OFF command is 
issued. However, based on requirements, if the temperature is commanded low for CP_HWM 
minutes, the software will issue a heater ON command. When the temperature command is 
set back to high for another CP_HWM minutes the software will issue a heater OFF command, 
which will not be redundant because the previous command was ON. 
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We ensure that the logical error described above does not exist in our specification by 
replacing the described assertion with the following assertion named 
UnExpectedRdntOFF: 
@T(UserBehavior = ThirdHigh) _> NOT(cRdntOFFCmd' =True) 
UnExp e c t edRdn t 0 F F ensures that we don't confuse between a normal OFF command 
and a redundant OFF command, as well as indirectly checking that two successive OFF 
commands are issued mistakenly. 
Running simulations using this assertion causes no violation. This gives us the confidence 
that our specification is correct as far as the requirements confusion regarding watermarks 
and their corresponding counters is concerned. Formulation of the assertions related to the 
redundant ON commands are not discussed here but can be performed in a similar manner. 
2.4 Evaluation 
The tool-supported resolution of requirements confusion introduced here has been shown to 
be effective. It allows the user to actively seek confusion resolution by entering expected 
behavior into the specification and running a simulation to verify the actual behavior. This is 
markedly more useful than looking at a passive model. Although the motivation for the 
watermark requirements pattern came from test-phase requirements misunderstandings, the 
resulting pattern and formal specification can be used to resolve requirements confusion 
involving watermarks at any phase of the system lifecycle. We implemented our technique 
using SCRTooI, but the approach described here is also consistent with the use of any state-
based specification tool that produces executable specifications. 
The benefits of formulating and using requirements patterns include: 
• Providing a reference for the specification of correct structure and behavior. Using 
the pattern as a guideline supports the development of a correct formal specification. 
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• Providing structural and behavioral properties that can be checked in the 
specification. Whether this is done through inspection or through tool-supported 
consistency and completeness checking (as in SCR), we can ensure that the properties 
are satisfied, and therefore have more confidence in the specification. 
For example, in formulating a requirements pattern for watermarks, we determined that a 
dynamic watermark has to be defined as an SCR term or controlled variable in the 
specification, since it is dependent on some other variable. This is an example of a structural 
constraint. Behaviorally, we determined that a dynamic high-watermark should never 
decrease unless it is reset. Symmetrically, we established a property that a dynamic low-
watermark should never increase unless it is reset. These behaviors can be mechanically 
checked against any specification that uses dynamic watermarks. 
Based on our analysis, we are able to state behavioral properties that should be enforced on 
dynamic watermark variables in all systems. The relationship between the behavior of the 
system and that of watermarks is a recurring source of requirements misunderstandings in 
testing with potential for recurrence in operations. Since our approach used patterns that 
were derived from real life experiences, it sufficed for the user to enter the exact "confusing" 
scenario in the resulting specification and then run the simulation to see if it is a valid 
scenario in the system. 
The tool-supported approach to resolving requirements confusion lends itself to reuse. Once 
the executable specification of, e.g., a dynamic high-watermark, has been created, we can 
reuse the model to resolve requirements confusion involving dynamic high-watermarks in 
other systems. Similarly, the model can be reused with minor adaptations for systems with 
static and/or dynamic watermarks. Each time a user encounters an unexpected behavior 
involving watermarks during any phase of the software lifecycle, the user enters the expected 
behavior into the executable specification. If the simulation of the specification causes an 
error, then the user knows that the expected behavior is inconsistent with requirements. By 
allowing the user to enter the expected software behavior during simulation, the executable 
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specifications highlight the discrepancies between correct and expected behavior. This is 
similar to the more-familiar technique of fault injection into a simulation to observe resulting 
behavior [33] except that here the injected fault is from the user rather than from the external 
components. 
In evaluating our approach, there are three limitations of concern. First, ideally we would 
like the user to be able to enter expected behavior "on-the-fly" during simulation. The goal 
of having users enter their expectations directly into the simulation is to preserve the integrity 
of the original specification. However, the tool used in demonstrating our approach (SCR) 
does not currently support that feature. Therefore, in our example, user expectations are 
entered in the original specification and then compiled to produce the executable 
specification. 
Second, the user expected behavior is represented through assertions, which are essentially 
logic formulas. The problem with this (pointed out by Rushby [37]) is that only simple user 
models can be represented by logic formulas. Incorrect, user-expected behaviors that we 
have encountered in practice have been relatively simple, so this has not been a problem to 
date. In case of more complex user behavior, tools that compare models may be preferable. 
Third, as with any model, the analysis is only as good as the model being used. In this regard 
the verification of the formal specification against the requirements pattern provides some 
limited assurance. 
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Chapter 3: Preventing Domain-Knowledge Related Software 
Defects through Timing Constraints on Input Data 
31 Related Work 
3.1.1 Domain Knowledge 
The issues surrounding domain knowledge have been explored by numerous researchers. 
Zave and Jackson identify the role of domain knowledge as one of the four dark corners in 
requirements engineering [42]. They conclude that the primary role of domain knowledge 
should be to support the process of refining requirements into specifications and hence 
bridging the gap between them. The results of Zave and Jackson implicitly support the 
theory that poor domain knowledge transfer can lead to defective software. Hanks et al. 
approach the problem of poor domain knowledge communication by introducing Domain 
Map, stool-supported structure that describes domain specific terms in the language 
common to software engineers [13]. Domain Map is similar to domain dictionary, 
introduced in Feature Oriented Domain Analysis (FODA) [19]. However, FODA was not 
developed to address the domain knowledge communication problem but rather to clarify the 
domain and its features in order to increase reusability. 
3.1.2 Requirements Defects 
Many researchers have identified requirements errors as a significant source of software 
defects. Lutz found that the majority of safety-related errors in safety-critical, embedded 
systems that she studied were a result of poor requirements [29]. Lauesen and Vinter 
identified that more than a half of the 200 defects reports for the system that they studied 
were related to requirements [23]. They also found that missing requirements was the major 
source of the software defects, followed by misinterpretation of implied requirements, i.e., 
the developer knows the need (which is not documented) but creates a wrong solution. 
64-
Several techniques have been developed to address the problem of requirements defects. The 
techniques have ranged from preventing defects from occurring to detecting the defects in 
either natural language requirements documents or formal specifications. The approaches by 
Hanks et al. and Kang et al. are used to clarify ,domain specific terms and hence assist in 
reducing incidents of misinterpreted requirements during software development. However, 
these two techniques cannot be used to detect missing requirements effectively. Lee and 
Rine address the problem of missing requirements in natural language requirements 
specification documents by paying close attention to missing requirements from multiple 
viewpoints [24] . Viewpoint-oriented requirements engineering approaches recognize the 
existence of multiple perspectives on any system, and provide a framework for discovering 
requirements conflicts posed by different stakeholders [3 8] . The approach by Lee and Rine 
uses a framework that consists of four models: viewpoints, enterprise, missing requirements 
types categorization (MRC), and requirements discovery and analysis models. Using the 
four models, possible missing requirements from a natural language specification document 
are projected. A likely limitation to this approach lies on the MRC. The MRC relies on a list 
of possible missing requirements from various researches. If a type of missing requirements 
is not in the list, then the approach will fail to detect the corresponding missing requirements. 
Jaffe et al. describe several criteria to help find errors in software requirements specifications 
for real-time process-control systems [17]. Their work applies Requirements State Machine 
(RSM) model [ 15] to specify and analyze software requirements. One of the criteria deals 
with input data age. Specifically it states that the validity of data from inputs used in 
specifying output events and/or in triggering state transitions, must be bounded in time. 
However, this approach has a limitation when the validity of data is defined by a quantity 
other than time. 
The goal of our approach is to add value to the existing requirements completeness 
techniques for process control systems such as [17]. We expand the way timing constraints 
for inputs are defined and through that increase the effectiveness in preventing domain-
knowledge related requirements defects. 
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3.2 Specification and Analysis of Timing Constraints on Data 
Usage 
In this section we introduce our technique for preventing domain-knowledge related software 
defects and apply it to an example. The discussion presented here assumes that the reader is 
familiar with both the Four Variable Model [35] and SCR method [16] described in Chapter 
2. The discussion is divided into four parts: description of the model used by the technique, 
the technique itself, the guidelines for specifying and using data-age variables, and 
application of the technique to an example. 
3.2.1 The Model 
The model used in this work is based on the Four Variable Model [35], commonly used to 
represent process control systems (e.g., an aircraft or a chemical plant). Software gets inputs 
from the environment via hardware sensors. Based on the readings and the software logic, 
the software issues commands and sends them back to the environment via actuators. In our 
model we divide the software into two main parts, the control module and the health-check 
module. The control module performs the control activities, whereas the health-check 
module examines the inputs to determine the validity of their values, as well as detecting 









Figure 21 -Expanded Four Variable Model 
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Figure 21 illustrates how data from the sensors is being used by the two software modules 
through aswitch-like structure. A dashed line represents a situation where data is not being 
used by a module, whereas a solid line indicates that data is being used by a module. In the 
diagram above, we have shown a case where data is exclusively being used by the health-
check module. This case applies in situations such as software initialization phase, when 
hardware diagnostic procedures are usually being performed. Control modules are usually 
not initiated during this period. 
The timing of input usage by the two modules (control and health-check) depends on the 
software design, particularly how data validity is being handled. Depending on the 
application, data validity could be checked during initialization, operation or shutdown 
phases. The approach taken in validating the input has an impact on our approach as 
described later in Section 3.3.3. 
3.2.2 The Technique 
We introduce a technique for specifying timing constraints for each input to the software 
using a corresponding variable called data-age. Each input variable defined in the system 
must have a corresponding data-age variable. The purpose of the data-age variable is to 
define when the input to the software can be used, or when it should be ignored by the 
software. 
Our technique extends previous approaches in that the decision to use the input does not rely 
on time only, but can also be made through observation of other quantities. This is discussed 
in detail later. 
Informally, the technique is divided into the following steps: 
1. Identify all inputs to the software module as defined by domain requirements. 
2. Assign adata-age variable for each input identified. 
3. Create a formal specification for the module as follows: 
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a. Specify the behavior of each data-age variable through guidelines provided in 
Section 3.2.3. 
b. Specify the behavior of the module using the data-age variables) as a guards) 
during state transitions and output events. 
4 Simulate the specification. 
Some of the guidelines for specifying and using data-age variables can be enforced by the 
specification tool while others need to be examined through manual inspection. Therefore, 
through simulation we can partially check the conformance of our specification to the given 
guidelines. We discuss the guidelines that can be enforced by the SCR tool and show how 
the simulation handles them. Note that other specification tools maybe able to support fewer 
or more guidelines. We selected SCRTooI because it is auser-friendly and widely used 
state-based specification tool with automated consistency and internal completeness 
checkers. Furthermore, SCRTooI provides simulation and runtime assertion checking 
capabilities, and was readily available. 
Simulation of any specification or implementation is a tedious task since each run only 
checks one of a very large number of scenarios. Therefore most practical approaches focus 
on checking for particular properties. Specifically, the choice of simulated scenarios will 
depend on what is considered to be of importance to the system. Since our work deals with 
safety-critical embedded systems, we focus on those scenarios that could cause the software 
to render the system unsafe. By applying such scenarios during simulation, we can either 
discover flaws in the specification or gain confidence that the specification handles them. 
The source of such scenarios is not the focus of this work. 
Figure 22 illustrates the technique and also shows how it fits into the waterfall software 
development model [3 8] . The waterfall model's phases are represented in bold font. 
Although not shown explicitly in the diagram, the formal specification phase and "system 
and software design" phase overlap. This is due to the fact that one has to know the role of 
software and hardware before developing a formal specification, a task that is performed 
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during system and software design phase. We separate the two in the diagram for clarity 
purposes. As shown in Figure 22, questions arising from the formal specification process or 
simulation are sent back to domain experts (requirements definition phase). Otherwise, 
detailed design and implementation follow. 
Requirements 
Definition phase 
1. Identify all inputs to 
the software 
2 . As s ign a data- age 
variable to each input 
3. Create a formal 
specification using 
data-age guidelines 
4. Simulate the 
specification 
System and Software 
Design phase 
Figure 22 -Specification of timing constraints steps 
The goal of this process is to target defects due to poor domain communication through the 
use of formal methods. Using our approach questions are expected to be raised by the 
specifiers (software engineers) regarding how to precisely define the behavior of data-age 
variable(s). Questions arising from simulation or manual inspection of the specification can 
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also be sent to the domain-experts for resolution. Requirements specification tools (for 
example SCR) offer extra mechanisms (such as consistency and disjointedness checking) for 
precise specification, and hence decrease the chance of creating bad specifications. 
Our technique for detecting and preventing domain-knowledge related defects depends on 
proper and accurate specification of data-age variable. Guidelines for specifying and using 
both the inputs and data-age variables are described below. 
3.2.3 Guidelines for Specifying and Using Data-Age Variables 
In this we present the guidelines for specifying and using data-age variables) in a formal 
specification. See Section 2.1.3 for a description of SCRTooI. The guidelines are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Each monitored (input) variable shall have an associated data-age variable. 
2. Each data-age variable shall have two states -Enabled and Disabled. 
3. Each data-age variable shall initially be in Disabled state. 
4. The transition of the data-age variable from Disabled to Enabled state and vice versa 
shall be clearly specified. (The transition can be a function of one or a combination 
of the following: monitored or controlled variables, state of the system, time, or an 
event). 
5. A monitored variable shall only be used as a valid input to the software when the 
corresponding data-age variable is in Enabled state. 
The last guideline (guideline #5) must be relaxed in some cases to allow the software to use 
data from an input variable while the corresponding data-age variable is in Disabled state. 
This case is described in detail in Section 3.3.3. 
The relationship between monitored variables and data-age variables can only be one to one 
or one to many in order to ensure precise specification and avoid overlap conditions. If one 
data-age variable is used by more than one monitared variable, the specification can be 
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ambiguous. For example, let monitored variables xand yshare adata-age variable z. When 
we want the control software to read input x we will enable z. This implies that variable y 
will also be a valid input to the control software, a condition that does not have to be True. 
Sometimes, we would like to take input from x while ignoring input from y. Therefore, 
using a shared data-age variable will not work. 
On the other hand, one monitored variable can have multiple data-age variables, hence the 
case one to many. Consider a case where we accept a command only when certain levels of 
pressure, temperature and volume are met. There are three parameters to consider before 
accepting the command. We could have the command as a monitored variable x, and have 
variables a, b and c be data-age variables for the three parameters indicating whether the 
desired levels have been met. There is still a one to one mapping between x and its data-age 
variables through a Boolean function such as ((a =Enabled AND (b =Enabled AND (c = 
Enabled). From mapping of this kind we can claim that the relationship between monitored 
variable and data-age variable is primarily one to one. One to one relationship makes the 
specification clearer and more concise and hence is favored in our analysis. 
B y introducing the data-age variable, we are able to specify timing constraints for a 
monitored variable in a complete manner. Control software uses the input from monitored 
variable in determining the output or a state transition only when corresponding data-age 
variable is in Enabled state. Otherwise, software will ignore the input and assume another 
specified action or take in a default input. Default value for data-age variable is Disabled, 
and therefore when the system is initiated no monitored variables values are used by the 
software until the corresponding data-age variables are Enabled. 
The transitions of data-age variable from Enabled to Disabled states and vice versa are 
decided by the software, based on the state of the system (Note that in our specification, the 
state of the system is a function of monitored and controlled variables, terms and current 
state). Depending on the behavior of the system, data-age variable could be set back to 
Disabled state from Enabled state. For example, if a system is used to determine chemical 
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composition of contents in a chemical plant between 200° F and 500° F temperatures, the 
monitored variable for the chemical composition will have a corresponding data-age variable 
set to Disabled between 0° and 199° F, then set to Enabled between 200° and 500° F, and 
then set back to Disabled from 501 ° F and above. The transition of the data-age variable 
from Disabled to Enabled sets the lower time bound (the earliest time that the monitored 
variable can be used), while the transition from Enabled to Disabled sets the upper time 
bound (the latest time that input can be used). 
Once adata-age variable is established for a monitored variable, the two will be used in all 
software computations involving the monitored variable. For example, suppose that two 
monitored variables X and Y are used to evaluate the value of another variable Z through the 
following Boolean formula (assuming that all A, B and Z are Boolean): 
Z=XORY 
Let A and B be data-age variables for X and Y respectively. We use the data-age variables in 
conjunction with input variables to evaluate Z as follows: 
Z = (X AND (A = Enabled) OR (Y AND (B=Enabled) 
The software specification will determine the inputs to the software (default values of X or 
Y) when A and B are Disabled. Jaffe's completeness criteria [ 17], deals with this issue under 
"essential value assumptions" criterion, that is, software requirements will specify what to do 
when there is no input. In our case study, when there is no input from the software due to the 
disabling of data-age variable, the software keeps its current state. 
3.3 Application 
In this section we apply our technique to a segment of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) flight 
software which was defective due to communication gaps during domain knowledge transfer 
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as described below. Software defects are believed to be the reason behind the loss of the 
MPL mission. The discussion of the MPL software description, failure mode and the 
accident investigation presented here were derived from [18]. The interested reader is 
directed to this source for more details. Note, the discussion in this section involves entities 
(such as variables) used in both the original MPL requirements and our SCR specification. 
We distinguish the two by representing the former in italic font and the latter in Courier 
New -font. 
3.3.1 Background 
On January 17, 2000, NASA declared the MPL mission lost after failing to communicate 
with it. A special review board was appointed by NASA's Jet Propulsion Lab (JPL) to 
investigate the reason behind the loss. According to the board's findings [ 18], the most 
probable cause of the loss was determined to be an error in the flight software which 
originated from defective software requirements. The defect was a result of a 
communication breakdown during domain knowledge transfer. The MPL spacecraft had 
three legs which were to be unfolded (deployed) from their stowed position as it approached 
the surface. Domain experts were aware of the existence of spurious signals (also known as 
transients) during the deployment. However, this information was not communicated to the 
software developers. As a consequence, the designed software ended up using the spurious 
signals as valid touchdown signals and inadvertently shut down the engines at 40m altitude 
above Martian surface. The spacecraft crashed and the mission was lost. 
Touchdown Monitor (TDM) 
Based on the MPL flight software design [18], the Touchdown Monitor (TDM) software 
module was responsible for detecting touchdown events and shutting down the MPL's 
engines. The TDM module was composed of two sub-modules: TDM_Execute and 
TDM Enable. The flight software initiated TDM module through cone-time command 
TDM Start at 1500m above the surface. This was approximately 12 minutes before the MPL 
reached an altitude of 40m. The 40m was chosen as an altitude at which software can start 
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using touchdown readings because experts had determined that the touchdown readings at or 
below this altitude could be trusted. 
The TDM was started at a relatively high altitude from the surface (before the leg 
deployment was complete) in order to keep the processor demand constant, and hence avoid 
transients in the CPU that could affect other programs. As a result, the software read inputs 
from the sensors long before reaching the ground. However, those readings were supposed 
to be ignored until an altitude of 40m was reached. 
A number of data variables were used for the TDM. The important ones are listed below. 
Each variable listed below is unique to its corresponding landing leg sensor with the 
exception of EventEnable and Touchdown Monitor, which were shared by all three landing 
legs: 
• CurrTDlndicator -reads input from the sensor every lOms, True means the landing 
leg has touched the ground, False means the opposite. Initial value is False. 
• LastTDlndicator -contains the previous value of CurrTDlndicator 
(i.e., value at t - lOms), where t is current time. This is performed by copying over 
the value of CurrTDlndicator to LastTDlndicator before reading from the sensor. 
Initial value is False. 
• IndicatorState -This variable is set to the value True if two consecutive touchdown 
events have been observed. Otherwise it remains False, which is also its initial value. 
• IndicatorHealth -shows the health of a particular sensor. It is updated once when the 
TDM Enable module is called. A check is performed to see if two consecutive 
touchdowns events have been observed (i.e., LastTDlndicator=True AND 
CurrTDlndicator=True) when the MPL reaches 40m altitude. If that is the case then 
IndicatorHealth for that sensor is marked Failed and readings from that particular 
sensor are ignored for the rest of the flight. Initial value is Good. 
• TouchDownMonitor -indicates whether touchdown monitor has been started or not. 
• EventEnable -This variable is set to Enabled when the 40m altitude is reached. This 
is done once by TDM Enable module. Initial value is Disabled. 
74 
Figure 23 shows the Touchdown monitor's functional flow diagram. As the diagram 
illustrates, when TDM is started IndicatorHealth is set to Good, IndicatorState is set to 
False, EventEnable is set to Disabled and TouchDownMonitor is set to Started. 
Immediately after TDM is started, the sub module TDM Execute is initialized. This module 
is called once every 10 millisecond. TDM Execute copies over the value of 
CurrTDlndicator to LastTDlndicator. It then proceeds to read the sensor from IO interface 
and writes it to the CurrTDlndicator variable. Then it checks to see if both CurrTDlndicator 
and LastTDlndicator are True. If that is the case then IndicatorState for that sensor is set to 
True, otherwise it is left as is. Finally, the TDM Execute inspects three variables: 
IndicatorState, IndicatorHealth and EventEnable. If they all evaluate to True, Good and 
Enabled respectively, a command to shut down the engine is issued. By design, the 
command to shut down the engines must be issued 50 ms after the touchdown event by at 
least one landing leg is confirmed. The strategy of not waiting for all three legs to touch the 
ground was implemented in order to prevent the spacecraft from tipping over. 
TDM Enable is initiated when the on-board radar detects 40m altitude. The flight software 
checks if TDM has started and then calls TDM Enable module. This module runs once and 
is called while TDM Execute is running. TDM Enable checks if two consecutive 
touchdown readings have been detected before the spacecraft reached the 40m altitude. If 
that is the case, the IndicatorHealth for that particular leg sensor is set to Failed and readings 
from that leg are ignored by the software for the rest of the flight. Otherwise, 
IndicatorHealth is left as Good. Finally, EventEnable is set to Enabled which allow the 
software to start using the sensor readings from any of the three leg sensors. 
Failure Mode Description 
The failure mode occurred when IndicatorState was set to True by two consecutive True 
readings from the leg sensors before reaching the 40m altitude (i.e., LastTDlndicator=True 
AND CurrTDlndicator=True). These signals were due to momentary spurious signals from 
leg deployment and were supposed to be ignored by the software. However, the software 
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prematurely read in these invalid touchdown readings and set IndicatorState to True. When 
the Lander reached the 40m altitude, a health check was performed and since the spurious 
signals had already disappeared, both CurrTDlndicator and LastTDlndicator correctly 
indicated False. As a consequence, IndicatorHealth was set to Good and EventEnable was 
set to Enabled. Since IndicatorState had retained the previous value of True, the three 
conditions needed for shutting down the engines were erroneously met and command to shut 
down the engines was issued by the software prematurely at 40m altitude. The correction 
suggested by the JPL report was to reset the variable IndicatorState each time TDM Execute 
module executed. Other issues such as better communication between domain engineers and 
software engineers, attendance of Product Engineers at walkthroughs of software that 
interacts with their equipment and identifying all hardware inputs to the software-decision 
logic were listed as lessons learned from this accident. 
3.3.2 Applying Dur Technique to the Touchdown Monitor (TDM) 
We apply our technique to the TDM software requirements in order to illustrate how we can 
use it to prevent the defect due to spurious signals. This involves specifying data-age for 
each monitored variable (input from the hardware) in the module. After defining adata-age 
for each monitored variable, timing constraints are specified in the software requirements. If 
the information needed to precisely specify adata-age variable is missing, an inquiry will be 
sent to the domain experts for clarification. It is the inquiry process that is expected to bring 
to light possible domain-knowledge related defects and also increase developers 
understanding of all the issues surrounding hardware inputs. 
In applying our technique to the TDM, we consider only one landing leg because, by design, 
touchdown information from one landing leg is sufficient to make the decision to shut down 
the engines. Furthermore, a specification that involves one leg (as opposed to three) is 











The four steps in applying our technique to the TDM module are described below. The 
variable names used in the actual SCR specification are highlighted using Courier New 
Font. 
3.3.2.1 Identify All Inputs to the Software 
Two inputs are identified for the TDM module: altitude reading from the radar and 
touchdown indicator from the landing leg sensor. The two inputs are represented in the SCR 
specification by monitored variables mAl t i tude and mCurrTDlndi cator, respectively. 
We also introduce another monitored variable called mTime in the specification. This 
variable is used as a clock during the simulation of the specification since the SCR tool does 
not provide a clock. 
3.3.2.2 Assign aData-Age Variable for Each Input 
Two data-age variables are defined for the two monitored variables introduced in the 
previous step. mAl t i tude is assigned adata-age variable called tAl tAgeVar while 
mCurrTDlndicator is assigned adata-age variable called tTDAgeVar. Both data-age 
variables have two states, Enabled and Disabled. The third monitored variable (mTime) 
does not require adata-age variable since it is not part of the original list of inputs for this 
module and does not have an impact on the implementation. 
3.3.2.3 Create a Formal Specification for the TDM Using Data-Age Guidelines 
In the SCR specification, mCurrTDlndi cator and mAl t i tude are used in conjunction 
with their corresponding data-age variables tTDAgeVar and tAl tAgeVar, respectively, 
in all computations. The data-age variables are used as guards for the monitored variables in 
all mode transitions or output functions. The report on the loss of the MPL [ 18] suggested 
that the software defect observed in TDM be fixed by resetting IndicatorState to False each 
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time TDM Execute runs. Our technique offers an alternative approach, which prevents the 
variable IndicatorState from being set to True in the first place before the 40m altitude. 
TDM Execute and TDM Enable modules are modeled using a single SCR specification from 
the textual requirements given in [18]. TDM Enable is modeled using the term 
tlndicatorHealth and mode class badSignal in order to check the health of the 
sensor. It also uses the data-age variable tTDAgevar as an indicator of when to start using 
the readings from the sensors. TDM Execute module is modeled by the rest of the entities in 
the specification as discussed later in this section. 
The SCR specification was designed using two user-defined types, three mode classes, three 
monitored variables, four terms, one controlled variable, two condition tables, three event 
tables, three mode transition tables and three assertions (Section 2.1.3 gives the description of 
these SCRTooI constructs). Common SCR specification conventions such as prefixes and 
postfixes were applied in order to make the specification easy to read. For example, 
monitored variables names are preceded by the letter "m", terms are preceded by the letter 
"t" while mode names are post-fixed with the word "mode". Note that in our discussion we 
may use names of entities defined in the original textual requirements and the SCR 
specification interchangeably. For example, CurrTDlndicator and mCurrTDlndi cator 
refer to the same variable. The former is the name used in the textual description whereas the 
latter is the name used in the SCR specification. 
The SCR specification for the Touchdown Monitor (TDM) is summarized by the dependency 
graph on Figure 24. SCRTooI automatically produces this graph from user-defined 
specification. As the diagram illustrates, the SCR model consists of three monitored (input) 
variables shown in the far left and one controlled (output) variable shown in the far right. 
The dependency graph shows all the entities in the specification and their relationships. For 
example, the controlled variable cShutDown depends on the three monitored variables 
(mTime, mCurrTDIn.dicator and mAltitude) via mode classes, terms, event functions 
and condition functions defined in this specification. 
79 
SCR Dependency Graph Window 
File Actions Settings 
' I~iTin~> 







Figure 24 -Dependency graph for the TDM specification 
Cti flUff~~Wtl' 
The rest of this section provides detailed description of entities defined in the specification 
for TDM. 
User Defined Types 
• xealth -defines the type for tlndicatorxealth which represents the health of 
a sensor. Legal values are Good or Failed. 
• DataAge -defines the type for the two data-age variables tTDAgevar and 
tAl tAgevar. Legal values are Enabled or Disabled. 
Monitored Variables 
• mAl t i tude -altitude reading from the radar. Indicates in meters the current 
altitude of the MPL with reference to Martian surface. 
• mC u r r T D I n d i c a t o r -reads data from leg sensor through IO interface. True 
means a touchdown event has been detected. False means a touchdown event has not 
been detected. Initial value is False. 
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• mT ime -used as a clock to represent passage of time during simulation of the 
specification. Initial value is 0. 
Mode Classes 
badSi gnat 
This mode class is used to determine the health of the sensor by defining modes that keep 
track of the number of consecutive "bad signals" detected so far. Bad signals are defined as 
false-positive touchdown events due to either transients (noises) or a defective sensor. Mode 
class approach is used instead of tracking the value of the two variables LastTDlndicator and 
CurrTDlndicator (as implemented in JPL Report) for simplicity and elegance of the 
specification. In SCRTooI, the process of copying over CurrTDlndicator to LastTDlndicator 
before updating CurrTDlndicator does not work in the same way as it does in programming 
languages. Instead, it requires LastTDlndicator to be a function of CurrTDlndicator (e.g., an 
event function). We also need to keep track of how many times LastTDlndicator and 
CurrTDlndicator have consecutively been True. This would require another function. 
Instead of defining two functions we achieve the two goals through the use of one mode class 
badSignal. 
Three modes are defined in this class: 
• noB adS ignalMode - also a default mode, indicates that no false-positive touchdown 
event has been detected. 
• firstBadS i gna 1 Mode -indicates that one false-positive touchdown event has been 
detected. 
• secondBadS i gna 1 Mode -indicates that two consecutive false-positive touchdown 
events have been detected. 
The mode transition table for the bads i gna 1 mode class is shown in Figure 25. If current 
state is secondBadSignalMode when health check is performed 
(t Indi catorHeal th table), t Indi catorHeal th is marked Failed. Note that we have 
used the monitored variable mTime (instead of mCurrTDlndicator for example) as the 
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variable whose change triggers mode transitions in this mode class and eventually determine 
whether a sensor is defective or not. The monitored variable mCurrTDlndicator is not 
used to trigger transitions in this mode class because it can be the same value in two 
consecutive states. For example, mCurrTDlndicator can be assigned the same value 
e.g., True in consecutive rounds of TDM Execute. SCRTooI defines an event as a change in 
mode class, variable or term's value and therefore having the same value in the previous and 
current states implies no event. Since the monitored variable mTime is used as a clock in our 
specification, it never gets assigned the same value more than once and hence is suitable for 
triggering events for this mode transition table. 
This mode class is also an example of an exception to guideline #5 described in Section 
3.2.3. The monitored variable mCurrTDlndicator is used to determine state transitions 
while the condition of its data-age variable (tTDAgeVar) is in Disabled state. This 
situation does not violate the guidelines for specifying inputs described but instead represents 
a situation where the health of the corresponding sensor is examined as described further in 
Section 3.3.3. 
TD Detected 
Three modes are defined in this mode class to keep track of the number of valid consecutive 
touchdown signals detected so far: 
• z eroTDMode -default mode, indicates that no touchdown signal has been detected. 
• f i r s t T DMo de -indicates that one touchdown signal has been detected. 
• s econdTDMode - indicates that two consecutive touchdown signals have been 
detected. 
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badSignal Mode Transition Function 
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~ar)C~mTime} AND NOT(rriGurrTDlndicator'A,ND noBadSignalr~~lode 
(tTDAgeVar= Disabled}} 
(~C(mTime} AND mCurrTGlndicator' AND secondBadSignalh,Jode 
(tTDAgeVar= Disabled} 
(c~C{mTime} AND NCiT(niGurrTDlndicator' A,ND noBadSignalh~totle 
(tTDAgeVar= Disabled)) 
(aC(mTime} AND !'dQT (mCurrTDlndicator'} AND noBadSignalhAotle 
itTDAgeVar=Disabled} 
~?CtmTime} AND mCurrTGlndicator' AND 
(tTDAgeVar= Disabled} 
secondBadSigr~alhtode 
Figure 25 -Mode transition table for mode class badSignal 
This mode class is used to keep track of touchdown events instead of the combination of 
LastTDlndicator and CurrTDlndicator variables due to simplification reasons mentioned 
earlier in the description of bads i gna 1 mode class. The mode transition table for 
TD_D e t e c t ed is shown in Figure 26. 
The event @ C(mT ime) which indicates that the variable mT ime has changed, is used as a 
trigger for mode transitions. Transition to s econdTDMode will cause IndicatorState to be 
set to True. Notice that whenever mCurrTDlndicator is used in determining the event 
that triggers mode transition, tTDAgeVar is also used and has to be in an Enabled state. 
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T[~ Detected Mode Transition Function 
TD Detected Mode Transition Function 
Name To ~:~etecte~~ 
S'attlz'e h Ev~rr~ts 
zeroTDMode ~a7ci1(mTime} AND (mCurrTDlndicator'=_True} AND 
ttTDAgeVar=Enabled} 
nrstTDMode ~C(rriTime} AND (mCurrTDlndii:ator' =True} AfdG 
(tTDAgeVar= Enabled} 
firstTDMode (rar7C(mTime} AND (mCurrTDlndicator'=Folse} AND 
(tTDAgeVar= Enabled} 
zeroTDMode @G{niTirnej AND (mCurrTDlndicator'=Folse} AND 
(tTDAgeVar= Enabled} 






Figure 26 - TD Detected mode transition function 
thrusterStatus 
This mode class has two modes, runningMode and shutDownMode. The purpose of this 
mode class is to keep track of the status of the MPL engines. Based on the scope of this 
specification, the default mode for thrusterStatus is runningMode, since the engines 
are running when TDM module is started. When a transition from runningMode to 
shutDownMode occurs, a command to shut down the engines is sent using the controlled 
variable cShutDown by setting it to True. The mode transition table for this mode class is 
shown in Figure 27. 
As Figure 27 illustrates, thrusterStatus mode transition table performs the final check 
of three variables t Indi ca torHeal th, t Indi ca torSta to and tTDAgeVar (here 
representing EventEnable) before shutting down the thrusters as is done in Figure 23. 
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tTDAgevar could be omitted from the events column in the table without affecting the 
behavior of this mode class because t I ndi c a t o r S t a t e does not get updated to Trice 
unless tTDAgevar is in Enabled state. It is included here in order to stay consistent with 
the final logic check before disabling the thrusters illustrated in the TDM functional flow 
diagram (Figure 23). 
We use tlndicatorState as the variable that triggers mode transition for this table 
because it is initially False and never gets updated unless a valid touchdown event is 
confirmed. If the health of the landing leg is bad (tlndicatorHealth = Baal and the 
tlndicatorState is eventually set to True, this mode class will not transition. In such a 
case we don't have to worry about resetting t I nd i c a t o r S t a t e to False because that 
landing leg is ignored by the software for the duration of the flight. 
Sty thruster5tatus Made Transition Function 
Name BthrusterStatus 
rur~nir~iaA~lnde 
tMrusterStatus (lode Transition Function 
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tTDA,c~e~~r~ar=Enabled,~,P~dC:~ 
tlr~dicatarHeelth = Goody 
~hutC~o~rmhlnde 




This term is the data-age variable for the monitored variable mAl t i t ude. The TDM 
requirements provided in the Casani report do not offer detailed behavioral description of this 
input. We include this data-age variable in the specification for completeness, since our 
technique demands so. We assume that the software begins reading input from the radar 
immediately after being initiated. This is illustrated in Figure 28 by enabling tAl tAgeVar 
when mTime > 0 (in our simulations time is represented in units of 1 and the execution 
begins with mTime=1). 
S~F tAl~t~~~d~rr ~ar~~iti~n Furst#i~r~ 
Name 'tAlt~,ge~}ar 
~~cxles 
~It~~t~ e'~~~a r 
~::: ,#t _: 
tAltAgeVar Gondi#ion Func#ian 
defines a Term 
C~nrl~ic}mss 




Figure 28 -Condition fitinction for data-age variable tAl tAgeVar 
t TDAgeVa r 
This term represents the data-age variable used to determine when yonitored variable, 
mCurrTDlndicator gets used by the program. Initially, tTDAgeVar is Disabled 
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meaning that mCurrTDlndicator is not used by the program until tTDAgeVar is 
Enabled. Figure 29 shows the event table for the term tTDAgeVar. 
As the diagram demonstrates, the term tTDAgeVar depends on the status of monitored 
variables mAltitude and mTime, and mode class thrusterstatus. tTDAgeVar is 
Enabled between the altitude of 40m and Om (during MPL descent). Transition from 
Enabled to Disabled occurs after the MPL touches the ground. At this point the engine 
thrusters have been shut down (thrusterstatus=shutDownMode). Note the use of the 
mAl t i tude' s data-age variable (tAl tAgevar) when the decision to enable 
tTDAgeVar is being made. 
Name tTCi,H,~~e'~,'ar 
tTDAge~far E~rent Function 





nth ru ste rStatu s= s h utD a~rn M a d e~ 
Disabled 
Figure 29 -Event function for the data-age variable tTDAgeVar 
87 
tlndicatorHealth 
This term describes the health status of a sensor. The value Good means we can trust a 
sensor while the value Failed means ignore readings from that sensor. An event table is used 
to define this term. 
Figure 30 illustrates the behavior of tlndicatorHealth. Note that mAltitude is used 
as a variable that will trigger mode transition along with its corresponding data-age variable 
tAl tAgeVar. In the flow of events, the input from radar reads 40m only once, hence this 
check will be done once per original TDM_Enable requirements. 
r 
5CR tlndicatorHealth Event Function 
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Mode Class k~:~dSignal 
aT(mAltitude = 40} WHEN ((tAltAgeVar=Enabled) 
AND ((badSignal = naBatlSignalMode} OR 
(badSignal = firatBadSignalMode)~) 
Goad 
~T(mAltitude = 40)1NHEN ((tAitAgeVar=Enabled) 
AND (badSignal = secandBadSignalMode)) 
Failed 
tt~ ttr~~~atarHea t~ 
Figure 30 -Event function for tlndicatorHealth 
When mAl t i tude becomes 40m, we check the state of mode class bads i gna 1. If the 
mode class is in secondBadSignalMode mode then tlndicatorHealth is set to 
Failed. Otherwise, tlndicatorHealth is left as Good, its original value. 
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tlndicatorState 
This term is specific to each landing leg and is used to indicate if two consecutive touchdown 
readings have been detected (TD_Detected = secondTDMode) by setting it to True. The 
condition table on Figure 31 illustrates the behavior of this term by checking the state of 
mode class TD_Detected. 
s~R tlndicatorState Condition Function 
Name ~ttndicatorState
1'Livrles 
tlndicatorState Condition Function 
Defines a Term 
Cvradit~nrss 
C;TD_Detected = sec~r~dTDMnde} 
tlndicatorState = `rue 
.ftl~  ~1nc9ic~tarStata 
P•Jt=~T r,TD_Detected = :=:~eor~dTDt~4ode} 
False 
Figure 31 -Condition function for tlndicatorState 
Controlled Variables 
cShu tDown 
This controlled variable represents an output command from the software to shut down the 
MPL engines. The specification uses thrusterStatus mode class to determine when to 
set the value of cShutDown to True. 
Figure 32 illustrates the behavior of the shutdown command. The moment mode class 
thrusterStatus enters shutDownMode (happens only once), the shutdown command 
is set to Enabled, i.e., set to True. This is shown by the middle column of the event table. 
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cShutDown Event Function 
Defines a Controlled Variable 
Name''cShutDo•,~~~n 
1'►r&ides ~'i~ents 
~~T(thrusterStatus = shutDo~,vnh~tode}I ~F(thrusterStatus =shutDownMode) 
True False--
Figure 32 - Event functioy~ for the controlled variable eShu tDown 
On the other hand, when the mode class transitions out of shutDownMode, the command is 
Disabled, i.e., set to False. Although this particular scenario is not included in the original 
requirements (since the craft was not intended to take off once it lands), we include it here for 
completeness purposes. 
Assertions
Assertions are used in SCR to represent statements that must hold during simulation of a 
specification. The statements can be used to represent properties that are critical to the 
system. Through simulation, one can observe whether the specification satisfies or violates 
the properties. During the application of our technique to the TDM module we identified 
three such properties that were represented as assertions, as described below. 
Cl o ckCh e ck 
This assertion represents the property of any clock, i.e., it never goes backward or gets 
assigned the same value more than once. The property applies to mTime, the assigned clock 
for the Touchdown Monitor's SCR specification. We define the assertion as follows: 
mTime' >= mTime, which means that. the value of mTime in the current state is always 
greater than or equal to the previous value. We use the "greater than or equal to" sign, as 
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opposed to "greater than" sign in order to cover the cases where an input other than mTime 
changes. SCRTooI follows the one input rule and therefore each time an input changes, all 
functions (including assertions) are computed. If the changing input is not mTime, then the 
assertion C 1 o ckCheck will be violated if it uses the "greater than" sign. 
CheckAl tAgevar 
This assertion represents the property "Each data-age variable shall initially be in Disabled 
state" defined in our guidelines for specifying data-age variables' behavior. It applies 
specifically to the data-age variable mAl tAgevar. The initial state is represented by the 
statement mTime = 0 . 
Ch eckTDAgeVar 
This assertion represents the property "Each data-age variable shall initially be in Disabled 
state" defined in our guidelines for specifying data-age variables' behavior. It applies 
specifically to the data-age variable CheckAl tAgevar. The initial state is represented by 
the statement mTime = 0 . 
The two assertions CheckAl tAgevar and CheckTDAgeVar are critical to our work 
since they involve data-age variables. Their detailed description is saved for the next section 
where they are used during simulation to enforce specific constraint on the data-age 
variables. 
3.3.2.4 Simulate the Specification 
In this section we check the created specification for conformance to the guidelines provided 
in Section 3.2.3. Depending on the specification tool used, some of the guidelines can be 
specified and therefore checked by the tool. The remaining guidelines need to be checked 
informally through inspection of the specification. 
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Our work on the TDM example has identified that guideline #3 can be represented in SCR 
notation and can also be verified through simulation. This guideline, "Each data-age variable 
shall initially be in Disabled state" can be enforced using SCRTooI's assertion checking 
capability as follows: 
mTime = 0 => data-age-var-name = Disabled 
The statement above states that adata-age variable (here called data-age-var-name) 
initially be in a Disabled state. The variable mTime is used as a clock in our specification, 
and the value 0 represents the initial state. Note that using this strategy we have to create an 
assertion like the one above for each data-age variable defined in the specification. 
Ideally we would prefer to check the guidelines statically, i.e., during specification. 
However, that is not possible because the user defined type for data-age variables 
(DataAge) is not a basic SCR type. For that reason, we check guideline #3 dynamically via 
simulation. The remaining guidelines cannot be checked without adding some extra features 
to the SCR tool and therefore are inspected manually. 
Figure 33 illustrates a case where the data-age variable tTDAgevar is initially set to 
Enabled instead of Disabled. As expected the SCR simulator encounters an error when 
checking the assertion C h e c kT DAg eva r which represents guideline #3 for tTDAgevar . 
Changing the state of the data-age variable back to Disabled causes no violation. The 
assertion for the remaining data-age variable has also been specified but its simulation is not 
shown here since it is similar. 
The remaining task involves simulation using selected scenarios. For the purpose of 
demonstration we selected two scenarios. One involves spurious signals that led to the MPL 
accident and the other involves a defective sensor. 
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SCR C:1D~cum~nts and ~~ttin~sl►AdministratorlMy Documents115U C~►ur~.. 
e c 
--- Initial State 
mTime = D 
mAltitude = 15DD 
mCurrTDIndicatar = false 
badSignal = naSadSignalN]ade 
tIndicatorHealth = Gaad 
cShutDawn = false 
TD Detected = ~eroTDMode 
tTDAgeVar = Enabled 
thrusterStatus = runningMade 
tIndicatarState = false 
tAltAgeVar = Disabled 
--- State 1  
SPEC'IFICr1TI0N :1SSERTION FAILED: CheckT'DAgevar 
rnTime = 1 tAltAgeVar = Enabled 
events read from C:'~Docurnents and Settings~Adrninistrator'duly DocumentstilSU CoursestiSprin~ 2004tiResearchtTDM1TDM4a.ev 
Figure 33 -Checking the initial values for data-age variables 
Figure 34 and 35 are simulations of the MPL specification. Figure 34 represents the actual 
scenario that allegedly caused the MPL to crash. In this simulation, a touchdown event is 
detected by the MPL from a leg with no defects (i.e., tIndicatorHealth =Good). As in 
the failure scenario, spurious signals appear and disappear before the 40m altitude (states 2, 3 
and 4). Our specification handles the occurrence of spurious signals as an indication of a 
possible bad sensor because a touchdown event is observed before it is expected. This is 
indicated by the transition of the mode class badSignal from noBadSignalMode to 
firstBadSignalMode, and then to secondBadSignalMode (states 3 and 4). Since 
the corresponding data-age variable tTDAgeVar is in Disabled state at that moment, the 
value of tlndicatorState variable is never set to True (equivalent to ignoring the 
readings from mCurrTDlndicator). This prevents the TDM_Execute from updating 
t I ndi c a t o r S t a t e to True and eventually issuing a premature shutdown command at the 
40m altitude when tTDAgeVar is Enabled (state 7). 
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The disappearance of spurious signals is indicated by the value of mCurrTDlndicator 
changing from True to False (state 5) and also by the transition of mode class badSignal 
from secondBadSignalMode to noBadSignalMode (state 6). 
A safe landing is observed when two valid consecutive True touchdown signals are detected 
after the MPL is under the 40m altitude. The command to shut down the engines is issued 
(state 12) and the variable tTDAgevar becomes Disabled (state 13). 
Figure 35 shows a scenario where one of the landing legs is defective. The software sets the 
variable t Indi catorHeal th to Failed (state 10), and ignores the readings from that 
particular sensor for the duration of the flight. As shown in the simulation, once 
t Indi catorHeal th is set to Failed, the engines cannot be shut down based on the 
touchdown readings from that sensor. This is illustrated the by lack of shutdown command 
in state 16, when the software detects two consecutive touchdown events from the sensor 
(represented by TD_Detected = secondTDMode) while tTDAgevar is Enabled. In 
this specification, we have focused on specifying the behavior of software using only one 
landing leg. If all three landing legs were applied in this example, the command to shut 
down the engines would depend on readings from any sensor with t Indi catorHeal th 
marked Good while meeting other requirements for landing. 
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SCR C:lQocumertits end Settin~slAdministratarthAy Doc+aments115U Courses~Spri... 
a C D 
Log :;~::: ;'?: •.•̀:~:~:'.>:~>?>> ~~~>:::.: 
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Figure 34 - Simulation of TDM involving spurious signals and a good sensor 
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Figure 35 - Siynulation of touchdown event involving a defective sensor 
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3.3.3 Using a Monitored Variable Data While the Data-Age Variable is in 
Disabled State 
There is one subtlety regarding the application of our guidelines for specifying and using 
data-age variables (Section 3.2.3) that could lead to design errors. The potential for errors 
arise during the process of examining the hardware sensors for defects. In this section we 
address this problem and relax one of our guidelines in order to handle it. 
It is common for hardware devices that provide input to the software (also known as sensors) 
to be checked for defects. This process can be performed by hardware monitoring devices, 
software, or a combination of the two. If software is applied for this task, values of the 
monitored variables which correspond to the sensors being examined will be used to 
determine the health of the sensors. 
Depending on the design, health-check on an input can be performed during the operational 
phase (i.e., the control software is using the input) or the non-operational phase (e.g., 
initialization or shut-down). In our approach, operational phase translates to some data-age 
variables being in an Enabled state while non-operational phase translates to all data-age 
variables being in the Disabled state. 
Health-check can be performed during non-operational phase (i.e., all data-age variables are 
in Disabled state) and hence contradicts the rule "software shall use an input only when the 
corresponding data-age variable is in Enabled state". If we impose the condition (data-age = 
Enabled) in the specification or implementation of a health-check module that checks for 
sensors' health during non-operational phase (i.e., data-age =Disabled), then there is a 
possibility of introducing errors in the specification and implementation. This potential 
pitfall is described in detail in the example discussed below. 
Consider the TDM functional flow diagram (Figure 23), where TDM Enable plays a role of 
health-check module and TDM Execute plays a role of control module. During health-
check, TDM Enable is called and it performs the following: 
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• Checks if TDM is started. 
• Checks if (CurrTDlndicator =True) AND (LastTDlndicator =True). If it is, 
IndicatorHealth is set to Failed because at this point EventEnable variable is still in 
Disabled state (i.e., the Lander is not on the ground yet and there are no transients, so 
the touchdown signals obtained indicate a defective sensor). 
In the TDM_Execute module, the value of CurrTDlndicator is copied over to 
LastTDlndicator every time this module is called (at a rate of 100 Hz). The following line 
shows the copying process: 
LastTDlndicator =CurrTDlndicator 
Suppose that we apply the condition tTDAgeVar=True every time we use the input 
mCurrTD I ndi c a t o r in the specification of both TDM Execute and TDM Enable. 
The copying process for the touchdown events becomes: 
LastTDlndicator = (CurrTDlndicator) AND (tTDAgeVar =Enabled 
Initially, LastTDlndicator is False and since we use CurrTDlndicator and tTDAgeVar in 
every computation, LastTDlndicator will never be updated (i.e., set to True) until 
tTDAgeVar is Enabled. 
To reflect MPL specification, we enable tTDAgeVar at 40m above the surface, after the 
health-check has been performed. As a consequence the statement: 
If (CurrTDlndicator = True) AND (tTDAgeVar = Enabled AND 
(LastTDlndicator =True) 
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which determines if the sensor is defective will always evaluate to False because both 
LastTDlndicator =False and tTDAgeVar =Disabled before tTDAgeVar is Enabled. As 
a consequence, IndicatorHealth will always be set to Good, a situation that could potentially 
lead to failure in identifying defective sensors. 
To avoid this flaw we pay close attention to the state of the data-age variable when 
specifying the health-check routine. If health-check routine is performed while input data is 
not in use (data-age =Disabled), then the guard condition used is the same i.e., data-age = 
Disabled. Similarly, if health-check is performed while data is in use, the condition data-age 
= Enabled is applied. The TDM is an example where health-check is performed while data is 
not being used by the control part of the software. 
Note that our approach still uses adata-age variable each time an input is used in the 
specification of a health-check module, just as it is done in a control module. The only 
difference is the relaxation on health-check module specification by allowing the software to 
use inputs even when the corresponding data-age variables are in Disabled state. 
3.4 A Different Approach to the Mars Polar Lander Defect 
Blackburn et al. applied Model-based testing technique to detect fault in the same MPL 
specification discussed in our work [1]. Their analysis was based on textual requirements 
supplied by Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company Astronautics Operations (LMAO), 
which developed and verified the MPL software. 
Their approach used Test Architecture Framework (TAF) which applies the SCR tool to 
model the requirements for the Touchdown Monitor (TDM). The resulting SCR 
specification was then converted to TVEC test specification. TVEC is a system that creates 
test vectors from a formal specification and then generates test drivers. Test vectors for 
TDM were generated and they were injected to the TDM code. Using TAF approach, 
Blackburn et al. were able to identify the error in the MPL software that led to premature 
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engine shutdown and demonstrate how it could have been prevented through testing. 
However, we have identified four issues that relate to their work as described in detail below. 
First, the failure scenario described in their work is slightly different from the one described 
in the official report [18]. According to the report [18], premature engine shutdown occurred 
due to the failure of the TDM component (TDM Execute) to reset an internal variable called 
IndicatorState which was set by spurious signals. Detailed description of this failure 
scenario is given in Section 3.3.1. Blackburn et al. [1] describes the failure scenario 
differently through the following sequence of events: 
1. Transient signals occur during legs deployment. 
2. Two consecutive readings (in [18] case LastTDlndicator and CurrTDlndicator) are 
incorrectly set to True due to transients in one of the landing legs. 
3. Sampling from the leg is turned off due to this (as a bad sensor) but the variables 
retain their values. 
4. MPL enters the second stage of descent (40m), and uses the values of the two 
variables that were never reset and eventually shuts down the engine (provided the 
leg had not been marked bad). 
The first and second events in the list above are consistent with account given in [18]. 
However, the third and fourth events differ from the official report. The third event could 
have occurred, but based on [18], the variables that read input from the sensors get refreshed 
every lOms and therefore they could have not retained their values. The fourth event 
described above is not possible due to the contradiction described in the second issue below. 
Second, the description of the failure scenario seems to be self contradictory. The failure 
scenario in their work is based on the statement "the program retained the state of the bad 
sensor information". Specifically, in the third event, the sensor was turned off, which is 
equivalent to being marked bad. Therefore, based on the fourth statement "provided that the 
leg had not been marked bad", the program should have never used readings from that 
sensor, unless the program failed to mark that sensor as bad, which would imply that the third 
event did not occur. In short, their description leads a reader to a conclusion that events 3 
100 
and 4 are exclusive. To make both events occur, the software logic has to fail to check for 
sensor being marked bad (event 4), something that was not stated in the account above. 
Third, their description suggests that the MPL design required that any sensor that indicated a 
touchdown signal during leg deployment (about 5 km above the surface), was supposed to 
marked bad. According to the official report on the loss of the MPL [18], the sensor is never 
marked bad due to spurious/transient signals. That is why health-check is done at 40m 
altitude, when all transients have disappeared (this estimate was based on Hall Effect tests 
done on the ground). Although developers were not informed about the transient signals, the 
software specification instructed sensors' health-check to be performed at 40m altitude in 
order to determine other failures of the sensors, such as mechanical or electrical. Since [ 1 ] 
description of the failure scenario is different from [ 18], their approach in detecting the fault 
in the MPL software does not deal with timing constraints for input, but rather determines if 
the readings were taken from a faulty sensor. 
Fourth, there is a potential logical flaw in their SCR specification for the TDM module, 
specifically the condition functions for the two entities TDM_thrus ter and 
First Marked Bad. First Marked Bad is a condition table that models the 
requirements for detecting a failed sensor, as well as the touchdown events. 
F i rs t_Marked_Bad = x (where x = 0, 1, 2, or 3) means that leg x is defective. The 
potential logical flaw originates from two meanings of the statement F i rs t_Marked_Bad 
= 0 as described below: 
1. First Ma r k e d_B a d = 0 means no leg has been marked bad, i.e. , no defective 
sensor. 
2. F i rs t_Marked_Bad = 0 -indicates that no sensor has been "activated" i.e., no 
sensor has read True touchdown event. 
The term Fi rs t_Marked_Bad is used in determining the value of the output command to 
the engines, hereby named TDM_thrus ter. The output command has two possible values: 
Enable and Disable. Enable means keep engines alive whereas Disable means shut down the 
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engines. The default value for this term is Enable, since engines must stay on until the 
touchdown event has been detected. The command to shut down the engines (i.e., 
TDM_thruster =Disable) depends on following conditions: 
TDM started = TDM_YES, with one of three possible conditions: 
1. First_Marked_Bad = 1, indicating that sensor leg 1 has been marked bad, and 
then sensor leg 2 (TD_Sen_2) or sensor leg 3 (TD_Sen_3) has become True. 
2. First_Marked_Bad = 2, indicating that sensor leg 2 has been marked bad, and 
then sensor leg 1 (TD_Sen_1) or sensor leg 3 (TD_Sen_3) has become True. 
3. First_Marked_Bad = 3, indicating that sensor leg 3 has been marked bad, and 
then sensor leg 1 (TD_Sen_1) or sensor leg 2 (TD_Sen_2) has become True. 
Based on this set of conditions, if TDM started is TDM_YES and none of the sensors is bad, 
i.e., First_Marked_Bad = 0, TDM_thrus t er will never change its state from Enable 
to Disable, which implies that the software will not turn off the engines, even if an authentic 
touchdown event has occurred. Based on [ 18] such a delay could cause the lander to tip 
over. 
Our proposed fix for this potential problem is to add a fourth condition for disabling the 
engines in their specification of TDM thruster as follows 
First_Marked_Bad = 0 AND (TD_Sen_1 OR TD_Sen_2 OR TD_Sen_3) 
This statement will take care of a scenario where none of the sensors is defective, while at 
least one of the sensors reports a True touchdown event. 
Beside the issues mentioned above, Blackburn et al. were able to detect some flaws in the 
TDM model using the TAF approach. The T-VEC generated test vectors and test drivers that 
detected several cases where TDM_thruster issued a command to disable the engines while 
the expected command was Enable. 
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In general, the TAF approach presents a valuable alternative approach to detecting 
requirements errors through testing. The extensive use of automated tools adds strength to 
their technique. 
3.5 Evaluation 
Kang et al. [ 19] and Hanks et al. [ 13] have focused on describing the complex domain 
specific terms in the language that can be understood by software engineers. These solutions 
have tackled the problem of poor domain-knowledge communication by taking atop-down 
approach, i.e., they have attempted to make sure that domain knowledge is well explained 
and well documented. The goal in those works has been to ensure that better communication 
of the domain knowledge is achieved so that the resulting requirements documents (whether 
formal or non-formal) are relatively complete, clear and consistent. However, neither 
approach suffices to discover critical missing elements in a requirements specification or 
enforce the needed constraints such as timing constraints for inputs. 
Our approach is different in that it attempts to find a way to discover domain-knowledge 
related problems and to prevent them through formal specification. Several works have 
taken a similar approach to requirements specifications, notably [17] and [27]. Our work 
focuses on finding specific problems (from incident or accident reports) that are related to the 
general problem of domain knowledge communication and see how a combination of formal 
and informal techniques can be used to prevent them. We have also shown that determining 
timing constraints for input data usage does not have to depend exclusively on timers or 
clocks, but can rely on computations involving other quantities such as temperature, pressure 
or altitude. 
The technique presented here has been shown to be effective in detecting and/or preventing 
domain-knowledge related software defects. The work outlines a systematic process for 
discovery and prevention of software defects through formal specification of timing 
constraints on software inputs. In summary the specific contributions of this work include: 
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• Identification of the link between domain-knowledge related software defects and 
timing constraints on inputs. 
• Introduction of the concept of data-age variable. 
• Introduction of a new way of specifying or implementing inputs using the 
corresponding data-age variables. 
• Setting the guidelines for specifying the behavior of the data-age variables. 
Through the application of our technique, a better understanding of the system is gained by 
software engineers since they are forced to specify the behavior of all inputs and their 
corresponding data-age variables. Clark and Wing have stated that it is through the process 
of formal specification that design flaws are discovered [4]. In the same spirit, we expect the 
application of our technique (which involves formal specification) to not only discover 
design flaws, but also requirements flaws caused by poor domain knowledge communication. 
Discovery of domain-knowledge related errors is possible through our approach because we 
focus on specifying inputs from the environment, whose requirements are usually handled by 
domain experts. 
As the formal specification is developed, questions regarding specific environmental 
conditions can be sent to the domain experts and hence defects can be detected this way. For 
example, when our technique was applied to the TDM module, we specified the behavior of 
two inputs (mCurrTDIndi Cator and mAl t i tude) and their corresponding data-age 
variables tTDAgevar and tAl tAgeZTar. In specifying the behavior of tTDAgevar we 
had to specify how it gets Enabled from its default state (Disabled) and vice versa. Since the 
developers did not know about ignoring the touchdown readings until the 4om altitude, they 
would have asked the experts on when to enable or disable tTDAgevar which could have 
led to a discussion on spurious signals and ultimately the correct specification and 
implementation would have been created. As we have shown in the simulations, even 
without specific knowledge about the spurious signals, the error could have been avoided. 
Through imposing timing constraints on the input mCurrTDlndicator, the software 
ignores readings from the targeted input until proper conditions are met. 
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The approach proposed here is more structured than that suggested in [ 18], i.e., allowing the 
software to read in the input, perform some updates of some variables and then reset those 
variables if preferable conditions have not been met. The approach suggested by the report 
[ 18] increases complexity in tracking which variables have changed and which ones need to 
be reset, something that can lead to a situation where some variable is not reset. In addition, 
through injection of safety scenarios, simulations can be observed by both software engineers 
and domain experts to ensure that the software meets both software and system requirements. 
Jaffe et al. deals with inputs' timing constraints by setting lower and upper time bounds for 
all inputs and in all transitions [17]. Specifically, they describe the earliest time and the latest 
time that an input can be used by the software. Although this approach has the potential to 
discover domain-knowledge related defects during the specification process, it falls short in 
situations where the timing of inputs' usage is not determined by time, but rather by other 
quantities. For example, in the MPL problem, touchdown data usage was determined by the 
altitude readings and not by time. One could compute time based on the altitude readings 
while the MPL was in descent phase and use the values to set the upper and the lower bounds 
for data usage. However, the computed values cannot be fully trusted because they rely on 
estimates of acceleration due to gravity, speed of the craft, air resistance etc., all of which 
could vary from the actual values. Therefore, it is more reliable to use altitude readings from 
the radar since they are more accurate. Our method allows data usage to be determined not 
only by time but also by other critical quantities such as altitude through the use of data-age 
variable. 
Although the work shown here has focused on timing constraints on inputs, the same can be 
done to output commands. For example, the problem in [9] could have been solved by 
applying data-age variable to the command to close weapons door and other commands as 
opposed to applying timers on all commands. Whereas using timers simplifies the job of a 
developer, it also shields him or her from being aware of the existence of mechanical inhibit, 
which led to the reported incident. We believe that critical information involving the 
environment such as the mechanical inhibit should be conveyed to the software engineers. 
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Our technique would have forced the software engineers to learn about the existence of the 
mechanical inhibit, leading to a better understanding of the system, as well as better 
documentation. 
Zave and Jackson have stated that all descriptions in requirements engineering should be the 
descriptions about the environment, and the role of domain knowledge should be to refine 
requirements [42]. Our work provides a step toward their goal by using the environment 
(inputs) and the specification thereof, to determine missing domain knowledge needed to 
fully refine the requirements. 
A limitation to our approach is the dependence of the analysis on the model being used. If 
the created model does not represent the system correctly or fails to follow the guidelines 
outlined in this technique, then our analysis offers limited assurance. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
This thesis describes two techniques, one to resolve requirements confusion and another to 
detect and prevent domain-knowledge related software defects through specification and 
analysis of timing constraints on inputs. 
In Chapter 2, we presented a technique for resolving requirements confusion when they occur 
in testing or operations. Along with the technique we introduced a requirements pattern for 
watermarks. The results reported in Chapter 2 show that the integrated application of 
requirements patterns and executable specifications can help resolve common requirements 
confusions that occur during testing and operations. The goal is to help the tester or operator 
understand any gaps between the required behavior of the software and the software behavior 
that they expect. This is achieved by defining requirements patterns for software units, such 
as watermarks, that have repeatedly shown up in anomaly reports for critical systems during 
testing and operations. These recurring requirements confusion are high-yield targets for 
reducing safety-critical incidents after deployment. 
The requirements pattern provides a guide for the formal specification, here in SCR, of the 
required behavior of software items that repeatedly have confused users in multiple systems. 
Simulation capabilities allow the user to identify, investigate, and understand potential 
misunderstandings of the required software behavior. The dissemination to the users of the 
requirements patterns and formal specifications is one method of resolution. Additional steps 
to prevent recurrence may include improved documentation and training. Identifying, 
specifying, and resolving these common sets of requirements confusion may also help 
prevent related requirements confusion in other similar systems. 
Future directions include expansion of the requirements patterns catalog. This involves 
further investigation of recurring confusions and formulation of associated requirements 
patterns. Furthermore, tool-support is needed in order to support watermark as a built-in 
type, expand the capability to enforce watermark constraints (notably dynamic watermark 
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behavioral constraints), and also to allow the user to enter "on-the-fly" expected behavior 
during simulations and observe the results. 
In Chapter 3, we presented a technique for detecting and/or preventing domain-knowledge 
related software defects through specification of timing constraints on data usage. Along 
with the technique, we introduced adata-age variable for each input variable to the software. 
A data-age variable is used to determine when the software can or cannot use the readings 
from the corresponding input. We also introduced and described the guidelines for 
specifying their behavior as well as how to use them. The guidelines include verifying that 
the data-age variable is an Enabled state before using the input. This rule is relaxed for the 
sensor health-check routines to allow input data examination when software is not using the 
inputs (e.g., initialization phase). The approach is unique because it establishes timing 
constraints on inputs without relying exclusively on timers or clocks. Instead, timing 
constraints can also be defined in terms of other quantities such as altitude, temperature and 
pressure. As a result, our approach can be used as a generalization of other input timing 
constraints techniques such as application of timers or clocks. The technique was applied to 
a part of Mars Polar Lander flight software. Through the application we have shown that our 
approach is effective in increasing the understanding of critical system behavior, as well as 
preventing software defects related to inputs from the environment. 
Future directions include tool-support, so that data-age is supported as a built in type. With 
this capability, the tool can also verify that each input variable defined in the specification 
has a corresponding well-defined data-age variable. More study of accidents and incidents 
involving software is needed in order to investigate whether a particular style of specification 
can help in discovering and preventing the observed incidents. In addition, the technique can 
be extended to specify timing constraints on output commands. 
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